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ABSTRACT
Zhang, Ping Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2019. Privacy Protection and Mobility
Enhancement in Internet. Major Professor: Arjan Durresi.
The Internet has substantially embraced mobility since last decade. Cellular data
network carries majority of Internet mobile access traffic and become the de facto
solution of accessing Internet in mobile fashion, while many clean-slate Internet mo-
bility solutions were proposed but none of them has been largely deployed. Internet
mobile users increasingly concern more about their privacy as both researches and
real-world incidents show leaking of communication and location privacy could lead
to serious consequences. Just the communication itself between mobile user and their
peer users or websites could leak considerable privacy of mobile user, such as loca-
tion history, to other parties. Additionally, comparing to ordinary Internet access,
connecting through cellular network yet provides equivalent connection stability or
longevity.
In this research we proposed a novelty paradigm that leverages concurrent far-side
proxies to maximize network location privacy protection and minimize interruption
and performance penalty brought by mobility. To avoid the deployment feasibility
hurdle we also investigated the root causes impeding popularity of existing Internet
mobility proposals and proposed guidelines on how to create an economical feasible
solution for this goal. Based on these findings we designed a mobility support system
offered as a value-added service by mobility service providers and built on elastic
infrastructure that leverages various cloud aided designs, to satisfy economic feasi-
bility and explore the architectural trade-offs among service QoS, economic viability,
security and privacy.
11 INTRODUCTION
Internet access paradigm has changed dramatically since last decade. Beyond tra-
ditionally accessing Internet from a computer, now Internet equipped devices have
been ubiquitous and greatly altered Internet ecology. Internet access and usage is be-
coming much more user centric, and rapidly shifting to full mobility. Smart phones,
for instance, cover more population than traditional computer users, and are carried
by people and connect to Internet almost anytime. IoT devices, as another recent
example, grow rapidly and are being deployed faster in order of magnitude than
any other previous prevailing Internet devices. These anytime, anywhere, and from
anything types of Internet connectivity hatch innumerous Internet applications, that
cover almost every aspect of everyday life as they unprecedentedly make informa-
tion so available, close, and convenient to access. Either through long range wireless
access network such as cellular data network, or shorter range access such as IEEE
802.11/Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, Internet applications’ client side more and more resides
on mobility-capable devices and connect through wireless networking. The upcoming
5G cellular network aims to replace traditional wired Internet last hops with cellular
data network. The edge of Internet is becoming full mobile and wireless.
However, on the other hand accessing Internet in mobile fashion still relies on the
Internet IP core to route traffic from source to destination, which is almost same as two
decades ago. Cellular data network provides limited roaming support but still couldn’t
solve mobility issue completely due to identity and locator coupling. Semi-seamless
Internet roaming access is achieved through workarounds by Push service or individual
applications. Additionally and more critically, this increase of Internet mobility also
increases privacy exposure. In particular network location and identity privacy are
facing more challenges, since Internet endhost essentially becomes mobile endhost.
Thus there are more data and characteristics exposed from the mobile style network
2access, but protection mechanism doesn’t get improved equally, nor being addressed
by new access technology. For example, when a mobile endhost connects to another
endhost, connections are setup with its exposed public IP address, which is either
its actual public Internet attach point, or a gateway close to its physical location.
That means from its exposed IP address all its peers can deduce the approximate
geolocation of it.
This is today’s real-world Internet mobility support and accompanied privacy
vulnerability. The upcoming 5G and included Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) would
not change the basic routing pattern but could bring more privacy concern when it
opens previous restricted access network to 3rd parties. We are motivated to find a
solution to fill this left gap of network privacy protection and generic Internet mobility
support.
1.1 Internet Mobility Proposals Failed in Real World
Mobility has been and still is one of the top requirements for current and proposed
next generation Internet. Significant research efforts are dedicated to find appropriate
solutions for mobility in the Internet, aiming to implement a “anywhere, anytime”
Internet connectivity experience. [1–14].
The overloaded IP address is recognized as one major impediment for Internet
mobility [6, 7], and there are several proposals to split the tight bound of identifiers
(ID) and addresses (Locator) of communicating entities, so logical connection can be
kept when address changed due to mobility [8–10,15]. Other proposals include routing
via invariant intermediate point [11, 12], or migrating connections from old address
to new ones [13,14]. However, none of the proposed Internet mobility solutions have
been largely deployed, and the only available method to access Internet in mobile
manner is through cellular data network.
David Clark, one of the Internet Architects once said: “Internet is about routing
money; routing packets is a side-effect." The Internet experience clearly indicates that
3no solution will be used in the Internet if it is not economically viable, independently
how technically sound the solution is. A long list of examples illustrates this “axiom."
So, various QoS solutions, including Differentiated Services (DiffServ) and Integrated
Services (IntServ), whereas considered “technically” scalable, after more than one
decade of intense research, and implementation in almost all endpoints and routers,
are not being used extensively, mostly because they are not economically viable in
the Internet. On the other hand, applications bridging the mobility gap have been
successful, such as Skype, WeChat, Messenger, etc., because users (directly or indi-
rectly) pay for the QoS of their applications and the corresponding service provider
generates revenues from such service.
We believe that several critical economic flaws have also made many “technically
feasible” mobility solutions infeasible in real world. First, existing solutions, based
on static intermediary forwarding, such as Mobile IP [11], HIP [9, 16] and similar
ones, require modifications on access networks. But, such ubiquitous deployment
of network changes does not offer enough economic incentives, especially for service
providers. Second, existing solutions require that all Internet users pay the cost of
deployment and operations of the given mobility support, even though a large portion
of users might not be mobile. Finally, while technical collaborations among involved
service providers are required, there is no mechanism to split the revenues among
them. Therefore, there are not enough economic incentives for such mobility services.
1.2 Cellular Data Network Taking Over
Despite research community’s enormous effort, today’s majority Internet mobility
support is done through cellular service providers: mobile device receives a private IP
address that’s routable within cellular service provider network, and Internet traffic
will go through a nearby Internet Gateway to public Internet. Generally, the IP
address issued by cellular network is allowed to roam across limited distance and
time, until then a new IP will be assigned and may also accompanied with changing
4of gateway. Existing connections must be terminated then re-initiated by the mobile
devices.
For the last decade accessing Internet from cellular network grows tremendously.
Comparing to other options cellular network is the most available and cost effective
one to access Internet in a mobile fashion, and practically dominates all popular
applications and platforms. The accessing devices are not limited to only cellphones,
but also to other personal electronics, vehicles, buildings, or just simply replacing
wired connections especially for the upcoming 5G.
Cellular network, although it is the most popular and successful business network
that provides proved mobility mechanisms, cannot solve Internet mobility all by itself
(which makes Internet an “overlay” above cellular network) and in fact it does need
help from Internet mobility support to ease the burden on its internal backbones and
gateways. Directly copying from cellular data network will not benefit Internet mo-
bility researches much as these two types of networks are based on opposite principles
and ownership model and Internet also does not have such regular and well optimized
network topology as cellular network.
Due to the nature of intermittent communication and non-routable address be-
hind gateway, it’s difficult to resolve mobile device’s network location and initiate
connection to it by peer host itself. To address this issue, major mobile OS vendors
and application vendors implemented “Push Notification” to emulate an on-demand
message pushing service, such as Apple Push Notification Service (APNS), Google
Cloud Messaging(GCM), or Microsoft Push Notification Service(MPNS). Under the
hood mobile devices keep live connections with Push service providers to receive real
time message. When one mobile user wants to communicate with another user, either
the message is delivered through Push service, or leverage Push service to bootstrap
a direct connection between mobile device and peer node.
The general availability is another issue of cellular based Internet mobility. Besides
it is not available to devices that are not cellular network equipped, Push notification
system are centralized proprietary services that different systems are not compatible
5with others. For example, in order to send message through APNS, both sender and
receiver must be able talk to APNS and having APNS client installed. Also, the Push
sender must register with APNS in prior. A device with only MPNS and another de-
vice only has APNS won’t be able to leverage Push service to communicate. To enable
cross Push system communication, applications have to manage the identity mapping
and communication channel translation themselves with extra external services. Push
notification as an indirect communication mode, nevertheless, cannot solve privacy
issue solely. Due to the architecture limitation it can only be used to send small piece
of data, e.g. 4KB as current standard. If peers want to use high-bandwidth commu-
nication such as video stream, a direct connection not through Push service must be
created separately. Additionally, Push service are usually OS/vendor bounded, and
without any legacy support. Existing applications cannot benefit from Push service
unless reconstructed. Usually it’s not an easy task and expensive as communication
model is different.
The upcoming 5G cellular network won’t change much in these areas as the major
improvements are in network speed and latency and aimed to replace landline Inter-
net. On the other hand, one new official component Mobile Edge Computing (MEC)
provides infrastructure for us to implement functionality to enhance. We will discuss
our use of MEC in following chapters in detail.
1.3 Mobile Internet Threats Location Privacy
When a mobile host connects to its peers, connections are setup on its exposed
public IP address, which is either its actual public Internet attach point, or a gateway
close to its physical location. That means using its IP address all its peers can identify
the approximate geolocation of it. Even worse, peers can not only track the trajectory
of the mobile host for its IP changes, but also capture high fidelity movement timings.
Unfortunately, any website can track their user’s IP history and run all kinds of
analysis and data mining to model user’s behavior. Mobile applications step one
6level further that can accurately track a single user’s movement and is able to form
a precise network address timeline, even when application is not granted access to
GPS location. Additionally, any mobile app providing direct communication exposes
mobile node’s location history not only to the mobile app vendor, but possibly to all
other contacts using the same app. Those information can be further used to project
its future location statistically [17–19]. On one hand this type of prediction can be
useful for certain purpose [20], but for a privacy concerned user it’s definitely not
good news.
The tighter bound of people’s identity to their mobile devices and applications
started to raise lots of privacy concerns. Research communities and industry have
responded: on the service side a number of technologies were proposed to anonymize
identity information when aggregating statistic or providing location based service
[21]; on the client side mobile users are promoted to give explicit permission to ap-
plications of using device’s geographic location, contact list, storage, etc. in order
to protect users’ privacy [22]. However, network access is usually granted without
explicit approval since most applications need Internet access to function. As re-
sult mobile users cannot easily protect themselves from application vendors who can
continuously track a mobile user’s network locations through the periodical commu-
nication between mobile devices and their servers. These network location, even not
as precise as GPS location, still reveals mobile user’s relative geo-location. With a
history of network locations it is not difficult to profile and identify individual users,
probe on their current and past where-about, and estimate the places where they
would be [18,23].
VPN has become a popular service as more and more Internet users start to
concern about their privacy. Through either private VPN service or multiple relay
networks like Tor, Internet users can hide where they are when communicate with peer
hosts or websites and hide who they talk to from ISP. However, today’s VPN service
doesn’t provide extra support of mobility, and adds performance overhead as traffic
always go through a static relay end host. The overhead will increase when mobile
7host moves to different network while still using same relay point. Additionally, VPN
services don’t handle incoming connection well.
Mobile users can choose to use Virtual Private Network (VPN) to proxy their
traffic for protecting their real network locations: VPN can tunnel traffic via VPN
server that is away from mobile user, so remote peers could only see VPN server’s
network address instead of mobile node’s. Usually VPN service providers offer a few
location options for their customers to choose in prior. Once selected all traffic of a
mobile node will go through the chosen VPN server. It becomes a dilemma to choose
VPN server: too close it correlates mobile node’s location; too far away connections
will be diverted away from optimal route which then incurs latency overhead and
other limitations. When mobile node moves, the changes of network attach point will
interrupt connections. Performance will be degraded when node moves away from
selected VPN server.
1.4 Dissertation Structure
The goal of this research is to propose a viable solution that can protect Internet
mobile user’s network privacy while enhancing generic mobility support. We started
by identifying the privacy issue and mobility support gap in current Mobile Internet,
then researched the root cause of why they are left unresolved, and at the end proposed
theory, new paradigm, and solution to solve them in this dissertation. In Chapter 2 we
will review notable previous researches on Internet mobility and privacy protection.
Then we propose our theory and design of a mobility support and network privacy
protection system in Chapter 3. Next, we present details of system design including
algorithms and simulation results for validation in Chapter 4. At last we conclude in
Chapter 5.
82 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
In this chapter we will investigate the fundamentals of Internet mobility and privacy,
summarize basic requirements, review a few most notable researches before we propose
our theory and design in next chapter.
2.1 Requirement of Internet Mobility
The best way to recognize Internet mobility is to identify function requirements.
In this section we will separate them into two tiers: the first tier that are fundamental
and must be provided by any solutions, and second tier that are still critical but only
start to receive more attention recently.
2.1.1 Basic requirement
Basic requirements are mostly functionality requirements, i.e. without satisfying
all of them, Internet mobility support is not complete.
• Reachability. This is the most fundamental requirement of mobility support
that a mobile Internet user is always reachable by other Internet users, which
means the movement of an Internet user will not prevent the delivery of messages
designated to it. This requirement does not imply that communicating peers
would know the exact Point-of-Attachment address of the mobile node since
that depends on the support mechanism, but it ensures Internet end hosts can
always send data to a mobile Internet user and know whether the data are
delivered, and vice versa.
• Continuity. The established communication should not be broken by the move-
ment of the mobile Internet users. This requirement generally can be referred to
9handover, although the continuous communication does not necessarily mean
continuous connection for example a TCP connection could be reestablished
without breaking context at application level, or restricted on the same device
such as that an Internet user can migrate his identity among multiple devices
or uses them simultaneously.
• Ubiquity. The mobility support should be available anywhere when a generic In-
ternet connection presents. That suggests the Internet mobility support should
not bind to any specific link layer or physical layer networks, devices, or proto-
cols, otherwise absence of any precondition would void the support.
• Security. Besides the security issues which inherit from static Internet and wire-
less network, a few new security problems are introduced accompanied with In-
ternet mobility where one user may have arbitrary Point of Attachment (PoA)
and one PoA would be reused by different identities at distinct time. Authen-
tication on identity becomes necessary for both initial conversation setup and
following movement or PoA change. Address authentication might be required
as well in some special scenarios. Confidentiality and integrity are facing more
challenges as well. The previous or later PoA occupier should not be able to
deceive the communication, nor chances to perform any Man-In-The-Middle or
relaying attack. Mobility support solutions should also prevent attacks aiming
to “block” a legitimate user by maliciously updating false PoA, or other DoS at-
tacks. Roaming across the boundary where different access policies are applied
would produce more sophisticated regulation requirement.
• Scalability. This is always one fundamental requirement for any network ar-
chitecture and protocols, though it is also hard to justify. Since the Internet
mobility support is for the whole Internet, then at least any general solution
should be able to support millions of users simultaneously and could be tailored
to a specific scale when needed.
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2.1.2 Advanced requirement
Besides the basic requirements that every Internet mobility support solution must
satisfy, several additional requirements may be required by specific applications, or
• Legacy application compatibility. Backward compatibility is necessary for gen-
eral mobility support solutions, though it depends on how much benefit could
the legacy applications gain from mobility support and how transparent the
support mechanism is. Any solutions that need modification on existing appli-
cations are not considered legacy application compatible. This backward com-
patibility also could be extended to operating system, i.e. no need to upgrade
or modify OS kernel.
• QoS: Latency. Generally, for wireless communication devices it is difficult to
provide assurance for QoS. On the other hand, de facto we all know tradition-
ally Internet architecture doesn’t provide QoS also. So, when these two come
together, we can image how difficult to support QoS.
As QoS comes to Internet mobility support, latency turns into most important
criteria. Latency are a highly application dependent criteria. It may refer
to the time used to find peers(resolution), setup connections, reconfigure after
moving(handover), or routing overhead. Latency of resolution and handover
are more significant since they may be performed repeatedly, and extra routing
overhead may apply if indirectly routing is employed. It is generally bounded
by time out length of communication protocols. For real time applications this
interval may not exceed several RTTs, and for others this interval may be limited
to several seconds.
• Privacy. Privacy is not an original design goal of Internet, and to some extent
implementation of privacy could impair performance. Nevertheless, for mobile
Internet more privacy issues appear. One issue is the location privacy. Current
Internet doesn’t provide mechanism to protect location privacy, though its mix
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of identity and address helps a little. Several projects are proposed to hide
IP during communication [24, 25], though high cost such as efficiency has to
be paid. For mobile Internet, the location information of a specific user might
become public. That means any peers having connection to this user might
know where he was from his PoA address. Then the exposed information could
be used to trace this user by mapping PoA address to geographic location and
even disclose his real identity and life pattern. Another issue is that access
network provider may have chance to touch personal information of users using
its Internet access.
• Energy and computation resource constrain. Apparently, a large portion of de-
vices used to access mobile Internet are hand handle or wireless devices. For
those devices, energy and computation resource usually are restricted. Besides
Physical and Data Link layer, designs of higher layer protocols and architecture
could have implicit impact on resource consuming, especially for wireless de-
vices. For example, reducing the amount of signaling would reduce the energy
consumption.
• Device temporary offline. Device sleeping had been proved to be necessary and
effective by cellular and wireless sensor network industry, to encounter energy
constrain. In addition, wireless connection could be affected by various fac-
tors and the radio signal would not always cover all areas. Both need special
treatment: all communication may be stopped for a while so state resume mech-
anism is needed; network may lose track of nodes or have duplicate/inconsistent
records; a large amount of undelivered data may need to be cached and rede-
livered; actively node wakeup is needed in case of emergency.
• Accountability. Accountability is a dampened requirement of original Internet
since at that time there was not much commercial factor in Internet. Now
Internet is ran by many independent commercial companies and Internet users
pay for their Internet access. Mobility support may need accountability if the
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payment needs to be shared. Another fact we want to note here is that a large
portion of Internet nodes would always be static, and they would not like to
pay for.
Requirements listed above are extensive but not comprehensive. Despite that, to
satisfy these requirements is not an easy task either.
2.2 Internet Mobility Paradigms
In this section we will review several primary methods of supporting Internet
mobility. They may not be completely parallel with each other to some extent, and
some of them certainly can be combined to provide more comprehensive support.
2.2.1 Message Box
Message box is one of the oldest methods to delivery message indirectly between
applications and is still a major one. Its inherited indirect pattern avoids the resolu-
tion of message receiver’s address. Messages sent are stored at intermediate node, the
message boxes, so wherever receivers move they can always check their message box
using any computer having Internet access. No message will be lost due to receivers’
roaming or off line, and neither the sender nor the box needs to know PoA address of
the receiver. One typical example of message box is Email that is one of the oldest
Internet killer applications. This active retrieval paradigm is also adopted by a few
solutions, such as i3 [15] which is discussed in Sec.2.3.5.
On the down side, the message box method has a few inherited disadvantages
for mobility support: 1)It is not real time communication. The latency of receiving
message depends on how frequently the receiver check his message box intentionally.
2)The sender cannot know whether the receiver is online or offline, nor whether the
message arrives in a timely manner. It is a practically one-way communication and the
acknowledgment message must go through the same process. 3) It requires the mes-
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sage box having a considerable storage capacity. 4) Routing inefficiency. Typically,
messages are routed through the sender, receiver’s message box, and the receiver. In
some solutions the message may be relayed via several intermediate servers, such as
email.
2.2.2 State/session resume
Session layer is part of OSI reference model and originally designated to support
session suspension and resume, which could implement part of handover functions.
However, this mechanism was not needed much in the early stage of Internet and
the TCP/IP model leaded to the obsolete of session layer. The function of session
layer is then merged into application layer and handled by applications. The result
of this is that applications use their own methods to implement session instead of
a general one. “Cookie” used in web browser is an example of session abstraction
implemented in application layer [26]. It is a piece of data which stores sets of states
and is generated by server or webpage scripts but stored at client side by browser.
Each time when the user visit websites the browser will send corresponding cookie to
present a gloss that communication is not disturbed by disconnection. TESLA [27]
is a proposal of providing a general solution aiming to help applications implement
session without extra effort.
The state/session suspension and resume mechanisms are good complement to
mobility support solutions in transport layer or below. On the mobile user side,
state/session resume mechanism could maintain the application states and reconstruct
connection which may be closed due to timeout at lower layers. Note that though
the session layer in OSI reference model is independent and distinguished with other
layers, the state/session resume mechanism could be used in protocols in any layer
and used more than one time.
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2.2.3 ID/Locator split
One well known issue of supporting Internet mobility is the tight coupling of IP
address and host identity, which is inherited from IP protocol. In static network
routing a packet to an address practically deliveries that packet to the station that
owns the address. In mobile environment, nodes typically change their location as
well as PoA frequently while moving. The most intuitive solutions are whether let the
node “carry” the IP address with it or give the node a “name” and bind connections on
that name instead of IP address. The former one would greatly degrade IP routing
efficiency except alternative mechanisms used (refer to Sec.2.2.5). The latter is to
separate communication identity and routing locator by setting up another level of
abstract name above IP address. This is the well-known and accepted “ID/Locator
split” idea and is recognized as one radical cure to Internet mobility. Separating ID
and locator also could benefit Internet for other means, such as mentioned in [28].
However, this behavior introduces challenges to legacy Internet protocols. TCP and
other connection-based protocols will become invalid since connections are bounded
on both sides’ IP address. Furthermore, hosts need a way to discover the IP address of
mobile nodes and follow its change. On the other hand, every scheme which employs
ID/Locator split paradigm could claim its support of mobility in a degree. However,
only introduce an ID system will not simply solve all mobility issue. A few open
issues are left such as transport layer modification and management of ID/locator
mapping, etc.
2.2.4 End-to-end connection reconfiguration/migration
AS we discussed above that current Internet protocols are IP address bound, then
another intuitive idea of remedy is to reconfigure or migrate the existing connections
after each move. For example, when a mobile user moves and receives a new IP
address, it will send this new address to its communicating peers and then both
sides could simultaneously reconfigure previous connections by binding them on new
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IP address. This is often referred as host mobility and is a well examined topic.
SCTP [29] has capability of address reconfiguration [30], and another typical TCP
solution is presented in [13]. Most of ID/Locator split solutions also adopts end-to-end
connection reconfiguration for host mobility, such as HIP [31].
This type of solutions follows the Internet end-to-end principle that the change of
endpoint addresses can be accomplished without a third party. It requires no changes
to the IP forwarding infrastructure either, instead modifying transport protocols and
applications at the end hosts. Nevertheless, some open issues are still left too. First,
this mechanism may disturb the connection related states of legacy protocols and
applications, such as states for flow control and congestion control.The synchronize
and keep-alive mechanism may timeout due to no incoming signal for long time.
Next, the modification on end host’s protocol stack introduces backward compatibility
difficulty. Unless both sides deploy the same modified protocol, they cannot talk to
each other. Additionally, the lack of third party bring an interesting issue: “dual
moving”, in which both sides move simultaneously and send the update messages to
the old address of the other. Therefore none of them would be able to receive the
update.Finally, an external helper is always needed for initial lookup and connection
setup, and authentication and privacy when needed.
2.2.5 Indirection routing
Current Internet architecture are based on end-to-end principle which emphasizes
the intelligence and state information are kept at end points and the core of Internet
is kept simple and stateless. Indirection routing solutions loosen the hold of principle
a little and are proposed to support mobility more transparently. Generally, this
type of solutions employs one or more fixed end points as intermediate points and do
indirection routing via the intermediate points. Through this way, the address change
of mobile nodes can be hidden from senders since senders would think that they are
communicating with a static peer and always send to the fixed delegates. The most
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obvious problem of this type of solutions is the inefficiency of routing and the need
of delegation. Modification on IP and transport protocols may also be needed at the
mobile nodes. The scenario that both sides are mobile nodes would make this type
of methods more complicated and less efficient.
2.2.6 Dumb terminal
The dumb terminal architecture has the longest history in computer networks and
is the always standard of telecom industry including PSTN and cellular network. For
a dumb terminal the mobility issue would become much simpler since all applications
are running at the centralized server and most of states are maintained at server
side as well. Therefore, temporary disconnection will not affect the applications,
and handover can be simply implemented by reopening connection. Recently the
popularity of “Cloud Computing” and powerful large data center bring the dumb
terminal idea back again. With the help of data center, an individual user can store
up to several GigaBytes data and even run complex applications such as 3D games on
centralized servers. To enable dumb Internet mobile terminal, the Internet network
infrastructure must become intelligent to do more work than it has been. However, to
abandon the powerful end point computers and construct a tremendous rich-feature
global network does not sound very scalable, and ironically cellular networks are
simplifying their backbone and push more works to cellphones.
2.3 Notable Mobility Works and Researches
2.3.1 Mobile IP and Variants
Mobile IP(MIP) is a family of IETF standards primarily defined in [11,32,33]. It
is among the most popular Internet mobility support solutions and has many variants
and enhancements [2,8,34,35]. NEMO (NEtwork MObility) described in [36] is about
the ubiquitous support of MIP. MIP uses static IP address as invariant identifier and
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tunnels packet between invariant Home Agent (HA) and local Foreign Agent (FA)
where Mobile Host (MH) resides. MIP family solutions are compatible with legacy
applications to some extents since IP addresses bound in sockets are static. However,
MIP requires access network modification and collaborated charging that is only
feasible in cellular and similar proprietary networks, plus the drawbacks of inefficient
triangle routing and mix of IP address and identity.
Milind Buddhikot et al. propose a MIP compatible architecture MobileNAT [12],
which locally translates between the invariant virtual IP address as ID and the dy-
namic one as locator. The key ideas in this architecture are: 1) use two IP addresses
- an invariant virtual IP address for host identification at the application layer and an
actual routable address at the network layer that changes due to mobility. 2) DHCP
enhancements to distribute the two addresses. 3) a signaling element called Mobility
Manager (MM) that uses Middlebox Communication (MIDCOM) framework to sig-
nal the changes in packet processing rules to the Network Address Translators (NATs)
in the event of node mobility. This proposal does not require any modifications to the
access networks and can seamlessly co-exist with the existing Mobile IP mechanisms
and therefore can be used to provide seamless mobility across heterogeneous wireline
and wireless networks. On the contrary, Proxy MIP [37] is another MIP variant that
eliminates the requirement of modification on mobile node, by introducing a Mobile
Proxy Agent at access network to delegate MIP functions on behalf of the mobile
node to make mobility transparent and let the mobile node think it never leaves the
home network.
2.3.2 DHARMA
DHARMA [38] is an overlay network improvement over MIP that provides session
layer function to support constant connectivity while roaming or sleeping. DHARMA
selects a location-optimized one from a set of distributed home agents to minimize
routing overheads. Set management and optimization are done using the PlanetLab
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overlay network. DHARMA’s session support facilitates transitions between home
agents and improves intermittent connectivity. Cross-layer information sharing be-
tween the session layer and the overlay network are used to exploit multiple wireless
links when available. DHARMA improves routing efficiency when do triangle or rect-
angle routing and is compatible with current and legacy application. However, a few
issues exist such as HA has no knowledge of legacy application semantic thus may
result in connection close from server side, and a well distributed overlay network
must present, and each node must be stable for a long period and capable to share
resource and bandwidth.
2.3.3 HIP
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [9,39] is an architecture that separates identifier
and IP address by introducing Host Identity (HI), which is based on public keys and
in the format of IPv6 address, to replace IP address for connection setup. HI is
initially acquired by DNS lookup [40], and mobile node keeps updating peers and
DNS record during move [31]. A HIP local daemon is responsible for replacing HI
with corresponding IP address when packets are sent to IP network. Rendezvous
server is defined for highly mobile nodes [41]. HIP is initially designed for end-to-
end security and supports mobility by the benefit of ID/locator split and end-to-end
locator update. It is one of most recent proposed solution and drawing much of
attention. HIP presents to be a clean-slate solution and aims to stack up IP layer
at end points. For current state it is not a complete solution for mobility support
yet. For example, it lacks definition of an efficient mobility management system. The
simple end-to-end locator update mechanism cannot deal with scenarios such as dual
moving, backward compatibility, and location privacy.
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2.3.4 FARA
FARA [6]is an abstract high-level architecture model aimed to provide general
guide line and a flexible framework for clean slate Internet architecture. The ma-
jor concept of FARA are using decoupled communication entities from network for-
warding mechanism, logic connection between entities called “associations”, and new
forwarding substrate called “Forwarding Directive” to form a flexible Internet archi-
tecture. Mobility is one of the major concerns of FARA, and it is primarily addressed
by ID/locater split. FARA suggests using rendezvous point to setup initial connection
to mobile node, or use directory service (DS) to lookup and keep track of mobile node.
M-FARA is a conceptual implementation of FARA which targets mobility support.
In M-FARA a “M-Agent (Mobile Agent)” is a static third-party rendezvous point used
to update address information to support mobility.
2.3.5 i3
Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3) [15]is an overlay network that offers an
indirect passive routing model. Instead of pushing data actively from sender side,
receivers express their interest of data in order to “pull” data from i3 network. The
interest is marked by an identifier (including sender’s address and port) of a specific
type of packets, which is called a “trigger”. i3 provides an alternative abstraction of
Internet’s end-to-end principle and emphasizes the motivation of receiver. This ap-
proach benefits routing schemes of multicast and anycast, especially for the case that
sender does not have enough or exact information of receiver’s identity or location. It
also alleviates the difficulty of deployment by using overlay technique. Due to the in-
direct routing mechanism, i3 supports simple mobility under its architecture, though
sophisticated function may not be able to be implemented due to lack of direct and
responsive channel.
Robust Overlay Architecture for Mobility (ROAM) [42] is a proposal to provide
seamless mobility for Internet hosts based on i3. ROAM takes advantage of end-host
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ability to control the placement of indirection points in i3 to provide more efficient
routing and fast handover and preserve location privacy for mobile hosts. In addition,
ROAM allows end hosts to move simultaneously, and is as robust as the underlying
IP network to node failure. Hi3 [43] is a combination of HIP and i3. It inherits the
architecture of HIP and use i3 as the mobility management system.
2.3.6 LISP
The Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP) [28] is another architecture
based on the separation of identifier, called Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs), and address,
called Routing Locators (RLOCs). EID-to-RLOC mapping are performed at RLOC
router and routing are accomplished by tunneling between RLOC routers. LISP is a
clean-slate architecture solution.
2.3.7 MobilityFirst
MobilityFirst [44] is another future Internet architecture that tries to address
mobility as the first level foundation of further Internet. The authors argued that
Content Centric Networking (CCN) was good for locating content in network but
was not scalable for routing on Internet. Instead they employ an identity and locator
separation mechanism, hybrid GUID and network address (HGN) routing, that uses a
Global Unique Identifier (GUID) to identify content and a distributed service Global
Name Resolution Service (GNRS) to map GUID to network address. The GUID was
considered as the “narrow waist” of MobilityFirst architecture.
Neither MobileIP nor DNS was considered suitable to manage ID/locator mapping
for MobilityFirst. Instead MobilityFirst translates human readable name to GUID
by “name assignment” services, then registers in distributed database implemented
by DMap [45] which is “a single overlay hop DHT”. DMap hash GUID into network
address such as IP and use router that “owns” that IP to store the actual GUID to
mobile node’s address mapping. To improve efficiency K random storage network
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addresses are selected that hopefully could place replica closer to originate of lookup
request. In case of hashing result in unallocated IP DMap would choose a deputy
AS router that has minimum “IP distance” for it. Although the authors claimed that
DMap does not require storage of additional state information, it still need to be
deployed to every router of all ASes. The simulation result showed lookup latency
could be around 100ms for 26000 ASes using data gathered from DIMES.
For routing and forwarding every router will make decision of whether store packet,
resolve GUID, reroute, etc. As result concept of End-to-End connection will not hold
any more, and packet will change its destination network address on the fly.
The author also vision that cellular carrier could potentially build a distributed
virtual private network on top of public Internet, and cellphones connected through
carrier’s E-UTRAN and EPC actually transmit traffic on public Internet infrastruc-
ture [46]. As a result, cellular carrier only needs to keep radio infrastructure and
customer relationships.
2.3.8 Cellular IP and Columbia IP Micro-mobility Suite (CIMS)
Cellular IP [47] is a protocol that allows routing IP datagrams to a mobile host. It
is intended to provide local mobility, hard and semi-soft fast handover support, and
IP paging. Cellular IP uses mobile originated data packets to maintain reverse path
routes. IP addresses is used to identify mobile hosts. Cellular IP semisoft handover
exploits the notion that some mobile hosts can simultaneously receive packets from
the new and old base stations during handover. Distinguishing idle and active mobile
hosts reduces power consumption at the terminal side. The location of idle hosts
is tracked only approximately by Cellular IP. Therefore, mobile hosts do not have
to update their location after each handover. When packets need to be sent to an
idle mobile host, the host is paged using a limited scope broadcast. A mobile host
becomes active upon reception of a paging packet and starts updating its location
until it moves to an idle state again. CIMS [48] is mobility support set including
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Cellular IP, Hawaii, and Hierarchical Mobile IP. The Hawaii supports Unicast Non-
Forwarding (UNF) and Multiple Stream Forwarding (MSF) schemes.
2.4 Mobile Internet and Cellular Data Network
Cellular network is the most successful and largest mobile network all over the
world. Because mobile Internet and cellular network share many similarities and
comprehensive researches have been done on cellular network, researchers could learn
a lot from it. Nevertheless, researches of mobile Internet are not intended to “rein-
vent the wheel”, since these two networks are based on different purposes and design
philosophy. The Internet mobility cannot be implemented by simply relying on cel-
lular network either. Before discussing the difference, we will take a brief review on
how cellular network deals with mobility and how it supports data communication.
Though there are various cellular protocols sets available, they share similar archi-
tecture. Here we use GSM [49] and General Packet Radio Service(GPRS) [50] as the
examples.
2.4.1 Cellular Mobility Management
In GSM a subscriber identity module (SIM) chip is used to represent a cellular
user(cellular service subscriber). It stores certain parameters including: cellphone
number, international mobile subscriber number(IMSI) , and other security and aux-
iliary information. A subscriber’s identity is bound to the corresponding SIM chip.
Each subscriber has a Home Location Register(HLR), which is a database server
permanently storing all data of the SIM and detail of service parameter including
billing information, and current location of the subscriber. When a mobile sta-
tion(cellphone) connects to cellular network, local Gateway Mobile Services Switching
Center(GMSC), which controls local cellular network, will request information from
HLR according to the identifier reported by mobile station, and then stores in Visitor
Location Register(VLR). The VLR ID is then updated at HLR by GMSC in order to
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paging the subscriber later. The mobile station(cellphone) is the most important part
to achieve mobility management. When it moves, it will periodically check location
area codes broadcast by base stations and employ a periodic location update proce-
dure to update its location information at VLR and HLR. This process of roaming
to another cellular is performed similar as the cellphone initial enters the network:
user information is retrieved from HLR and roaming agreement is checked as well;
then local network will decide whether accepting the roaming cellphone then updat-
ing HLR. When a call comes in, it will first reach the subscriber’s HLR derived from
IMSI, then HLR will return a temporary number provided by VLR, or an error code
if no VLR is currently registered.
2.4.2 Cellular data network
Due to the circuit switching mode, in cellular network calls are relatively easy to
manage and quality of service could be guaranteed since resources can be assigned
in prior. However, this circuit switching mode doesn’t suit the discrete data packets
transmission well. Users do not want to pay the cost for idle connection which is
charged the same even when the cellphone has no data packet in transmission. GPRS
is a packet-oriented solution intends to support OSI model and IP protocol to provide
burst data packet transmission on a shared TDMA channel. It works at IP layer and
below to present a general IP interface to both ends. The cellular network assigns an
IP address to the cellphone, either public or private according to cellular company’s
policy. A Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) connected by several base stations
is responsible for diverting traffic to voice network or IP network. Then a Gateway
GPRS Support Node (GGSN) which connects SGSN will act as an Internet router
to forward the packets. The SGSN and GGSN works as intermediate proxy between
mobile host and Internet. Since the roaming changes the attach point of the mobile
station, in order to maintain a transparent continuous connection cellular network
uses tunnel between original GGSN and local SGSN to maintain the exposed public
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IP address plus port. Therefore, the IP packets from public Internet are still received
by the original GGSN, and then forwarded by the cellular network to the new local
SGSN. The IP address assigned to the cellphone is also kept so sockets bound to it will
not be affected as well as the applications. Through this way the mobility is handled
inside the cellular network, with the tradeoff of increased routing overhead. From the
description above we could infer that cellular data network has an ID/locator split
naming framework and employs architecture very similar to MIP. For example, HA
corresponds to HLR plus GGSN and FA corresponds to VLR plus SGSN. MIP is also
very popular in cellular network and used to increase the flexibility and compatibility
of cellular data network, such as tunneling between GGSNs in public Internet instead
of purely within cellular network.
Though currently cellular data network is the largest network of accessing Internet
mobility, it cannot solve all Internet Mobility issues. To support Internet mobility
via cellular network will de facto make Internet an “overlay” network above cellular
network. Providing major functions in the “underlay” cellular network is not effi-
cient either for routing or protocols operation . For example, TCP is not able to
know packet dropping is caused by network congestion or by radio interference. The
retransmission mechanism of base station will make the scenario more complicate.
The routing efficiency could be impaired too because all incoming and outgoing traf-
fic must go through the original GGSN no matter where the cellphone moves, unless
MIP is employed to stack up another layer of mobility support. When both endpoints
are cellular subscribers the overhead will increase further. Additionally, accessing In-
ternet from cellular network will tightly bind Internet users to specific cellular service
providers, which differentiates the mobility support service to other common Internet
services that can be accessed anywhere. In the case when a user having generic Inter-
net access but is out of the coverage of his cellular service provider, Internet mobility
is not available neither.
The experience of cellular network cannot be directly copied to Internet. Though
cellular network backbone is on the trend of All IP Network(AIPN), cellular networks
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are completely proprietary, and the topology of cellular access network are highly cor-
responding to geographic topology. The proprietary network leads to cheap routing
within own network and contrary when outside. It also makes collaboration billing
feasible within own network. The correspondence to geography also makes handover
and mobility management much easier, though “jump” of Internet mobile nodes (two
access networks are geographically close but topologically far away) may show differ-
ent mobility pattern compared to cellular network [51]. In addition, the rule of dumb
terminal and intelligent network of cellular network opposites Internet’s traditional
end-to-end principle that makes the copy of cellular network more difficult.
2.4.3 5G and Mobile/Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC)
The fifth-generation cellular network (5G) [52, 53] is already on horizon and has
started pilot deployment. Compared to current 4G cellular data network, 5G focuses
on much faster speed and lower latency, but no notable changes to mobility man-
agement paradigm or IP backbone. On the other hand, one new component Mobile
Edge Computing (or Multi-access Edge Computing, MEC) brings ubiquitous public
computing that creates opportunity for systems that can benefits from computing at
Internet edge.
Edge Computing(EC), the concept of moving data and computation to network
edge rooted from Content Delivery Network (CDN) [54]. Recently it came back to
draw more attention: a few paradigms, such as Fog Computing [55,56], Mobile Edge
Computing [57–59], Edge Cloud Computing, etc. are all further extending this idea.
Compared to traditional Cloud Computing which aggregates computation and data
at centralized data centers, Edge Computing utilizes the computation and storage
capability of the edge. This architecture not only leverages the sparsely distributed
but combined vast edge resources, but also pushes data and their processing closer to
end users. After all, no matter how much higher bandwidth modern Internet provides,
the speed of light still remains the same: the latency of sending a bit across countries
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didn’t change much albeit the bandwidth is magnitudes higher. Additionally, there
are always sensitive data that end users don’t want to transfer to data centers, or
at least must be partially processed and trimmed before sending to remote backend
servers.
MEC is one of the most practical EC paradigms, mostly because of its already
ubiquitous presence and capable network and computation resource, while at the same
time cellular network is already powering the majority of mobile Internet users. Es-
sentially, it’s analogous of cloud computing that mobile radio service provider/cellular
operators allow generic application to run on their ubiquitous Radio Access Network
(RAN) network controllers and base stations. Compared to data center-based cloud
service offering, this cloud is closer to end customers, having less latency and higher
availability, and more importantly this architecture offers capability to application to
access or manage cellular network traffic and configuration, thus easier and cheaper
to implement a number of network services, and with less operation cost. The no-
tion of Multi-access EC beyond Mobile EC wants to expand its ubiquity even further
such as including Wi-Fi network into the picture. MEC as one of the most practical
Edge Computing architectures, has great potentials of implementing(or enhancing)
emerging network paradigms, such as 5G network, Fog computing, and Edge Cloud
Computing. It roots in cellular networks, and could quickly become prevailing with-
out long ramp-up years.
2.5 Notable Privacy Works and Researches
Privacy issue caused by mobility, especially location, has been well studied. Mon-
tjoye et al. [60] found that from a large set of anonymous movement data, using four
data points of hourly data can identify 95% unique users. Given the identified move-
ment pattern of this identified user, they can even construct a history of this user’s
locations from the anonymized data set. Ma et al. reached the same conclusion [23].
This clearly shows location information, even after anonymization, can greatly threat
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a mobile user’s privacy when it can be collected by adversary. Cloud Computing
and Big Data just make this exploit more available and accessible [61]. However,
without proper protection, a mobile host cannot hide its location since it is network
location will be exposed to any peer it communicates and the network location is
approximation of its physical location.
The TOR network [25] is an overlay network designed to allow an Internet end-
host to secretly communicate with peer end-hosts without exposing either content,
source, or destination to traffic carrier. It achieves that by source creating a circuit
step by step until reach destination and being the only one has that knowledge. Each
redirection point in a circuit selected by source, called Onion Router, only knows
its ancestor and descendent and owns a unique session key with source. Source uses
several layers of encryption to achieve confidentiality and control of exit point (leak-
pipe) so that no Onion Router can trace more than one step of the traffic either north
or south.
Tor was designed and implemented as a non-prototype application can be used
on Internet by real users, and quickly became one of the most popular utility to
access Internet privately. It provides perfect forward secrecy and source-controlled
path promises anonymity and can avoid filtering and traffic analysis from ISPs. It
also enables a way to provide anonymous service. The most trade-off of Tor’s privacy
protection is increased latency, especially for application such as webpage browsing
due to small file size and multiple concurrent TCP connections. Tor could be attacked
on exit node if no end-to-end encryption and authentication deployed, or when ma-
jority of Onion Routers are controlled by single identity. Tor users also face dilemma
between performance and path length.
Another popular research area is to protect against user profiling from Location
Based Service (LBS) while can still use it [62–64]. Wernke et al. [65] surveyed differ-
ent identify protection types and common mechanisms to protect and attack privacy.
Usually a compromise between quality of service and privacy is optimized by manip-
ulating location reporting frequency, precision, or both [66]. For example Shokri and
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Theodorakopoulos et al. [67] designed an approach to hide user’s profile against adver-
sary by solving it as Bayesian Stackelberg game. Primault et al. proposed mechanism
to reduce profiling exposure, by hiding POI where user stops, and let user exchange
their trajectories when meet [68]. On the other hand, researches also show obfuscated
location data while can improve location privacy but cannot stop adversary to infer
relative precise Point Of Interests (POI) [69]
Another focused area is to increase anonymity of collected user location data
[21], limiting shared location information, or evaluating privacy exposure level before
sharing location data [22]. On the other hand, there are researches pointed out that
because human mobility trace is very unique [60], even completed anatomized data
can still be used to extract patterns and identify individuals [17–19]. So as long as
relative location and movement is collected, location privacy can be compromised to
certain context.
Privacy is also a major concern of Internet Of Things (IoT) [70–72], as wearable
devices constantly collect sensitive information and communicate with other Internet
hosts, more data will be available to profile a user more precisely.
MobilityFirst [44] is a proposed new Internet architecture that emphasizes mobility
support, comparing to existing Internet architecture. Privacy and communication
security are one major challenge for MobilityFirst. Access control is proposed to
apply to MobilityFirst so that only allowed network entities can contact a host or
resolve its network locations. [73]
Shi et al. [74] summarized the characteristic of “new” Edge Computing pushed
by blooming of Cloud Computing and popularity of Internet Of Things (IoT), and
listed a few challenges and opportunities of this new area. Standards of MEC are
being actively developed by cellular industry and standardization group [57]. It is
considered as one building block of 5G network [75,76], and its capability of offloading
computation from core network is especially emphasized [77].
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Roman et al. [78] studied and summarized common security threats and challenges
of multiple paradigms used in mobile edge computing and mobile cloud computing,
and pointed out needed improvement of security design.
2.6 Internet of Things
Internet of Things(IoT) has received substantial interest from academic research
and industry in last a few years [72, 79]. With capability of ubiquitously and contin-
uously collecting, processing, and responding to real world environment, it has vast
potential that can become next greatest innovation after Internet. Personal electron-
ics, office equipment, house appliances, public infrastructures, and ubiquitous sensors:
in IoT everything can be connected to Internet and also interconnected. They com-
municate locally, regionally, and finally to Internet. Collections of these devices and
their supporting backend processing system are combined to create intelligent system,
such as smart home [80], smart infrastructure [81], or even smart city [82], etc. IoT is
expected to greatly automate daily routines, free people from repeatedly intervention,
improve efficiency and eventually create new life styles and business opportunities.
IoT devices collect data at different scale and granularity. Typically, even a small
setup will collect massive amount of metrics and data, and upload large quantity of
raw or processed data to remote service, in order to store and/or further process. For
example, a smart home setup can upload house’s temperature, humidity, and electric
usage every a few minutes. Additionally, it could continuously upload status of garage,
doors, and windows for security. For controlling the smart home may continuously
monitor presence of other IoT devices to turn on or off of lights accordingly. The
house’s centralized system waits to receive control signals from remote service which
relays input house owner sent from remote devices: such as increasing thermostats’
temperature setting since they are coming back to home.
Most of data collected by IoT device need to be processed and aggregated before
sending to remote backend service [80], since amount of raw data is huge that usually
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it is infeasible to send all back, and most of time it’s not necessary either. Backend
service can usually make good enough evaluation based on aggregated data. However,
one challenge is that not every IoT device has enough power to aggregate and process
all data, especially when distributed processing among heterogeneous devices is in-
volved. The second challenge is latency. The pure data transmission latency, usually
measured by Round Trip Time (RTT) and bandwidth between IoT device and remote
server, is more perceptive and critical than traditional web applications, especially
when control is involved in feedback loop. A completely remote controlled IoT device
can hardly be managed in real time just because of the communication delay and
potential network jitter. The third challenge is privacy. Collecting and uploading
large amount of data inherently do not play well with privacy [83]. Additionally,
although a lot of researches focused on IoT security [84–86], privacy protection re-
ceives in-proportional less attention [87]. IoT system user cannot fully rely on IoT
system vendors to protect their privacy, because data sent from their IoT devices are
stored in vendor’s remote data storage which may subject to leak and abuse. Also,
some research concluded that privacy invasion is more severe than researches antic-
ipated [88]. Network location privacy, among one of many privacy concerns, needs
further protection. Because no matter how obscure and anonymous the uploaded
data is, the network location and traffic pattern will expose enough attacking vectors
for adversaries.
2.7 Distributed SDN Control Plane
Software Defined Network (SDN) has been prevailing since last decade and gradu-
ally taking over of managing network programmatically and automatically, from small
office network to cloud data center network. It employs standard and cheaper net-
working hardware and configures them globally and dynamically according to needs
and usage, to achieve an agile and resilient network configuration while simplifies net-
work management. Centralized control (either logically or physically) [89, 90] is the
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most adopted SDN control plane paradigm, not only because it is logically simpler
but also because generally optimal configuration requires global view, state main-
tenance, and centralized control. The scalability and single-point-of-failure issues
inherited from centralized model can be mitigated by implementing centralized logic
control plane as distributed system [91,92]. Particularly cloud service providers have
complete control from edge to core inside their cloud data centers so that they can
monitor and control every participant, including router/switch, gate ways, services,
etc. For reliability and load distribution the web service interface and back end logic
are distributed and replicated on multiple hosts. On the other hand, due to the real
time characteristic, sometimes sub-optimal solution is acceptable or even preferred as
long as it can satisfy the performance requirements.
For example, Hong et al. [90] developed a new approach to update WAN scale
network configuration without causing temporary congestion or fluctuation between
data centers. Their approach is to control switches by globally coordinating service
sending rates and globally allocating paths. They developed an algorithm that is less
computational complex for better scalability for computing large scale forwarding rule
configuration, by computing sub-optimal rather than optimal solution. The overall
controller is a logically centralized process and evaluate distributed collected inputs
for every 5 minutes.
One notable idea of Hong et al.’s approach is to reserve “scratch” capacity (e.g.
10%) of each link so that when flipping configuration overflowed traffic can use them
to avoid congestion. Hong et al. proved a congestion-free update can be produced,
and they produced an algorithm can minimize “steps”, which are deployment stages,
of an update. One benefit enabled by this frequent configuration updates is that for-
warding rules can be simplified to smaller size to ease the load further on configuration
computation and deployment.
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3 THEORY AND DESIGN OF MOBILITY SUPPORT SYSTEM
We want to provide a solution to fill the last gap of mobility support and protecting
location privacy, while also want to ensure our solution will not have the feasibility
issue of previous solutions. First in Sec 3.1 we will identify how an Internet mobility
solution can become successful in real world: that it must be a ubiquitous “add-on”
and having only beneficial paying for it. Next in Sec 3.2 we propose an architecture,
Mobility Support Service (MSS) that combines mobility support and proxy protec-
tion while satisfying the requirements: a system strategically creates a dynamic Proxy
network for a mobile node to achieve best balance between privacy, performance, and
cost. A centralized SDN controller manages relay servers in multiple cloud data cen-
ters, and proxies are dynamically allocated on demand to form a proxy network for
each mobile node. All connections between mobile node and peer nodes are through
proxies that are close to peer nodes. As result both the real network location and
mobility characteristic is hidden completely from peer nodes, and mobile node can
enjoy full legacy compatible seamless mobility support for any Internet applications.
Additionally, we observed the opportunities of leveraging MEC to improve perfor-
mance and lower operation cost. We further introduce the metrics we developed for
measuring performance and privacy protections, and their use in MSS in Sec 3.3. The
we discuss typical scenarios in Sec 3.4 and attack models in Sec 3.5.
3.1 Feasibility of Internet Mobility Related Proposal
Internet now is not a research tool any more, and the running of Internet involves
lots of business factors and numerous individual organizations. A solution for Internet
would not succeed any more if it overlooks the business feasibility, even if it is perfect
in technique, and there is no exception for Internet mobility support. While several
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clean-slate Internet mobility support solutions exist [93], we support the idea that
current Internet architecture would continue to survive for a decade or more [94] and
it is further backed up by business factors discussed in following sections. We also
suggest that current IP routing and forwarding infrastructure is capable to support
Internet mobility.
3.1.1 Mobility support should be ubiquitous and optional
The nature of Internet mobility suggests that the mobility support should be
accessible at any time and in most places when an ordinary Internet connection is
available. Internet mobility support solutions relying on the modification on access
networks, such as installing new infrastructures or agents, would be merely available
at a small portion of Internet subnets and consequently lose ubiquity and continu-
ity. In addition, endpoints of Internet vary from platforms and access techniques.
Solutions optimized for specific access techniques would be not general enough. For
example, handover mechanisms optimized for cellular network may be not applied to
WLAN. Portable devices will not embrace solutions having heavy signaling overhead
or requiring uninterrupted connection due to energy constrain. This requirement sug-
gests that Internet mobility support should not bind to specific networks or depends
on subnet modification. This requirement also weakens the incremental deployment
idea for extending coverage area and inspiring incentive that may work in other fields.
Once Internet mobility support is deployed, the number scale of mobile users
could be up to thousands of millions. This is a huge number that challenges the
scalability of any proposal, but also implicates that the mobility support will only
benefit a fraction of Internet endpoints, since a large portion of Internet endpoints
will always be static stations. The cost of implementing, deploying, and running
Internet mobility support should be paid only by the mobility users rather than every
Internet user. Solutions that require change on Internet basic infrastructures such
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as DNS or subnet routers will practically bind mobile users and static users together
and indistinguishably “charge” them the cost.
Implication of this characteristic shows Internet mobility support should be pro-
vided as an “add-on service” rather than a built-in/default feature of Internet, at least
for current Internet architecture.
3.1.2 Business factor of Internet Mobility Support
Internet is a network owned and managed by various organizations all over the
world with different intention and targeting customers, which means no one is capable
to regulate all subnets of the Internet nor independently provide Internet access. This
is a radical difference between Internet and cellular networks or like. One cellular ser-
vice provider usually possesses of tremendous proprietary networks with full control
and make internal change all by their will. In order to deliver calls and data cellular
carries signs one-to-one peering agreements with a few other equivalent providers,
or even provide services entirely by themselves for “in-network” communication. On
the contrary ISPs need to collaborate to guarantee the connectivity of Internet by
constructing a shared IP routing and forwarding infrastructure to connect every sub-
net. Generally, ISPs only sign peering agreements with adjacent or higher/lower level
ISP/NSPs so that privilege can be implicitly inherited hierarchically. One ordinary
IP packet delivered may go through several ISPs among which do not know or talk
to each other.
On the other side, collaboration between ISP/NSPs is limited to the scope of
basic IP routing and forwarding, which is the “thin-waist” of protocol stack and the
only common functionality provided by all Internet infrastructures. First, consensus
more than that can hardly be achieved among ISP/NSPs. For example, policy and
classes of DiffServ are not honored the same way by different ISPs. Even not each
bit of IP options is respected and treated the same way by all ISP/NSPs. Second,
cost of collaborated management is exorbitant. To sign detailed peering contract
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with all potential ISPs is an infeasible job for any ISP. Techniques of implementing
collaboration management at Internet scale are also proved not scalable for current
Internet architecture, such as IntServ. In addition, collaborate accounting, which
distributes the exact income for each participant, is always difficult to achieve and
already expedited failure of several proposals including IntServ, DiffServ, and MIP.
Implementing Internet mobility support associates with cost. Experience shown
that it was almost impossible to push all ISPs to upgrade their networks to accommo-
date a new service, besides above reasons. Business companies need enough incentive
to deploy and operate new services. For Internet mobility support, customers who
are willing to pay it need to know from whom they can purchase the support, and
organizations willing to provide the support need to be able to collect the payment
from mobility users to make profit. All these require clear definitions of roles and
relations, to build feasible business models. When the profit is enough, even some
not so scalable solutions could be feasible in business. While QoS failed in Inter-
net but succeeded in cellular network, one of the reasons, besides the data pattern
and network ownership, is cellular carriers can collect enough payment and users are
willing to pay for it.
The ownership, cooperation, and incentive pattern suggest that Internet mobility
support should be an independent service separated from network infrastructure, and
is accessible from any place of Internet based on the most basic functions of IP routing
and forwarding infrastructure, to avoid explicit collaboration as much as possible.
3.1.3 End-to-end host mobility
The end-to-end(E2E) mobility issue has be intensively researched [4, 8, 9, 13, 14,
27, 38, 42]. , which to some extent could be considered as a solved issue. The idea is
similar: update addresses at peers after each change of address so existing connections
could be reestablished or migrated. This idea can be implemented in different layers
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and in different format at endpoints, though it also partially adopted by network-
based mobility support solution [33,35].
E2E mobility solutions have relative lower deployment cost since most non-E2E
solutions also need to modify endpoints, and they usually have less impact on rest
static endpoints. We believe it is a necessary feature for all Internet mobility support
solutions, and E2E handover can be performed totally at endpoints: lossless handover
could be achieved by soft handover through protocols support multihoming [30] and
state resume for hard handover.
However, E2E mobility support solutions solely cannot implement all functionali-
ties of Internet mobility support. Besides potential conflicts with legacy applications
and OS protocol stacks which can be solved by adding middle layer or agents, exter-
nal help must exist for initial connection and dual movement that peers at both ends
change addresses simultaneously. In addition, disconnections are always inevitable,
varying from short period where physical channel is interfered or shielded, to long pe-
riod where mobile devices are out of network coverage or during active sleep. When
the handover is between different ISPs or a vertical handover such as between cellular
networks and WLAN, a “jump” in network topology, i.e. a long topology distance
handover, could happen. This “jump” might not be a rare instance for Internet mo-
bility and it may impair solutions specifically optimized for adjacent subnet roaming.
The various types of physical network interfaces and indoor/outdoor environment
could limit the efficiency of solutions depending on handover prediction. E2E mobil-
ity solutions cannot achieve complete transparency at endpoints. Help from access
network could improve performance and user experience, but this kind of help can
only be optional, to avoid the dependence on specific access networks.
3.1.4 Security and privacy
Internet mobility brings more challenges to security and privacy than ordinary
static Internet use for that mobility brings more vulnerabilities in these two aspects.
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Solutions that do not take them into account are not complete and have less chance
to be adopted. Besides end-to-end encryption to ensure message confidentiality and
integrity, Internet mobility support solution must authenticate communication peers
and provide forward secrecy since the same address would be shared by different users
at different time.
Similarly, privacy protection, especially for location privacy, is another required
functionality Internet mobility support solution must provide. While several point
solutions have been proposed [95–98], the mobility support system must integrate
network location privacy protection from beginning of design. The system should
also give its user capability to specify and control the trade-off for location privacy
protection, as under different scenarios users can have different privacy choices, or
even turning off network location privacy protection when user already sharing GPS
location with their communication peers. Therefore, one essential capability is to
have fine grain, per connection location privacy protection, instead of globally on/off
choice.
3.2 Mobility Support Service Architecture
We have proposed the original Mobility Support Service(MSS) in [99, 100] and
improvements in [101–104]. MSS is a system that provides mobility support and
privacy protection to MSS customers/subscribers, while satisfying the economical
and feasibility requirements we proposed in Sec 3.1.
MSS is provided as a distributed service over the Internet that it can serve cus-
tomers virtually anywhere. It does not require any change on access networks, existing
network infrastructure, legacy applications, and operating systems. Instead MSS is
provided as a value-added service to customers who are willing to pay for enhanced
mobility and privacy protection, based on single one-to-one contract between cus-
tomer and service provider. Therefore, providers generate its own revenue and justify
the business and investments.
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While keeping global service coverage, service provider can choose scaling between
minimum presence to almost everywhere, and setup system on various underlay archi-
tectures, such on premise servers, on pubic cloud servers, on Mobile Edge Computing,
or being hybrid involving multiple source of servers. The different choice of underlay
architecture and server allocation will result in different regional performance and op-
eration cost tradeoff, up to the favor of service provider. Single service provider can
provide service to any customer, and at the same time customer could use multiple
different provider if needs.
In this section we will describe MSS basic concepts, design principles, and theo-
retical evaluation. First, we give system overview in Sec 3.2.1 and then walk through
details of major components. At the end of section we will illustrate how MSP can
freely scale their footprint to suite their business and operation needs.
3.2.1 Parties and Entities
There are three different parties in system: Mobile Node, Peer Node, and Mo-
bility Service Provider(MSP). Mobile Node (MN) is device the MSS subscriber used
to access Internet and connect to peers. Peer Node (PN) is the peer side Internet
end-host on the other end of connection, that it either receives connection from Mo-
bile Node, or initiates connection to Mobile Node. Peer Nodes can be web server,
ordinary Internet host, or another Mobile Node. MSP is the MSS service provider
providing mobility support and location privacy protection service to Mobile Node.
To receive MSS’s privacy protection and mobility enhancement, Mobile Node user
only needs to sign a single contract with an MSP and this MSP becomes the only
one knowing Mobile Node’s network whereabouts. MSPs are independent from in-
frastructure provider (such as ISP), and any MSP can have global presence, though
their capability of where and how much they can allocate server will determine their
services’ performance. A MN could also use multiple MSPs at the same time for
connecting different Peer Nodes, if desired.
39
The key component to enhance mobility support and protect network location
privacy is Proxy, which relay traffic between Mobile Node and Peer Node. The
data link between Mobile Node and Peer Node are identity-based mobility friendly
connection such as HIP [39], and data link between Proxy and Peer Node are ordinary
TCP or UDP connection. Applications on Mobile Node still connect to Peer Node
through the original protocol such as HTTPS and they are not aware of their traffic
actually being tunneled by MSS agent on MN and relayed at Proxy then reaching
Peer Node. Therefore, Mobile Node can move and change Internet attach point freely
and existing connections applications depending on will not be interrupted. Network
location privacy is also protected since the exposed network address is Proxy, not the
actual attach point MN has.
Figure 3.1.: MSS network architecture
To avoid the performance penalty of this VPN-like traffic relay, MSS employs a
novelty paradigm: aggressively pushing Proxy close to Peer Node, and have multiple
concurrent Proxies serving different Peer Nodes. When Proxy is very near to Peer
Node no matter where Mobile node moves to, the route via Proxy is almost identical to
optimal route. Having concurrent Proxies will make sure all routes Mobile Node has
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been near optimal so that it doesn’t need to scarifies some Peer Nodes’ performance
for some other Peer Nodes, as shown in Fig 3.1.
This design doesn’t require any change on the Peer Node side or Peer Node’s net-
work so it avoid the lacking incentive dilemma. It can also support legacy applications
without modification further reduce the gap of adopting this new service. Addition-
ally, it doesn’t have performance penalty or difficulty of choosing relay location that
traditional VPN has.
3.2.2 Mobile Node
Mobile Node is the mobile device hosting mobile user’s identity and applications.
It roams across different network and continuously communicates with its peers. Dur-
ing its movement, Mobile Node keeps changing its network attach point and exposes
different public network address (such as public IP address) at times.
Mobile Node has MSS agent deployed, which handles incoming and outgoing traffic
globally or per user specification. Connections between Mobile Node and Proxies are
identity based, and all traffic are tunneled through these connections, as shown in Fig
3.2.
The reason MSS agent is designed this way is because it requires minimum mod-
ifications on operating system and legacy application thus has least endpoint de-
ployment cost. Compared to the layer insertion between IP and transport [9, 10]
this method would be more complex but provide more flexibility. For example, a
multi-homing capable transport protocol can thus be used to implement lossless soft
handover. End-to-end authentication and symmetric session key generation between
Mobile Node and Proxy are performed for each address change or connection time-
out. MSS also have capability to seamlessly upgrade service or deploy new services,
because all these changes would merely need to upgrade the deployed MSS client.
When a Mobile Node wants to connect to a Peer Node, MSS agent on host will
request a Proxy from MSP control plane. This Proxy will be allocated at a network
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Figure 3.2.: Mobile Node
location as close as possible to Peer Node, and it connects directly to Peer Node.
The traffic between Mobile Node and Peer Node is tunneled though Proxy using
identity-based connection [105] between Mobile Node and Proxy. Proxy will be the
exposed network address and will not change no matter where Mobile Node moves
to. Therefore, Mobile Node’s real network address and movement are completely
hidden from Peer Node. When Peer Node is an ordinary Internet host and connection
is bound on IP address, MSS provides additional mobility support that traditional
network protocols can work transparently without interruption even if Mobile node
is temporarily offline or changes network addresses. All these benefits are achieved
without much network latency overhead because Mobile Node’s movement will never
deviate its route from optimal one much, including scenarios Mobile Node performing
vertical handover which could change network location dramatically.
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3.2.3 Proxy
Proxy is a process that relays Mobile Node’s traffic, and it runs on an MSS man-
aged server, called “Virtual Router”.
There are two types of proxies: outgoing Proxy and incoming Proxy. Outgoing
Proxy is short lived and created on-demand when Mobile Node wants to create new
connection to Peer Node. It is initialized by Mobile Node sending request to MSP con-
troller. MSP controller will then create new Proxy that has minimum communicate
cost to Peer Node, and the selection is also limited by current resource availability
and customer’s SLA. The Virtual Router, which is assigned to host this Proxy, then
just chooses a random outgoing port and uses its own address to create connections to
Peer Node. Then it instructs the chosen Proxy to update/initialize and take over the
connection while waiting form tunnel opening request from Mobile Node. Example
sequence is illustrated in Fig 3.3.
Incoming connection means Proxy must listen on a given port for incoming con-
nection requests. Therefore, incoming Proxy are exclusive, since one specific listening
port can be exposed for only one Mobile Node on a Virtual Router. Listing Proxy
must be created in prior and are dynamically adjusted according to recent address
queries, amortized management algorithm, and also historically statistic. Due to the
resource scarceï1
4
Œlisting Proxy is more expensive than outgoing Proxy, and popular
port (such as 80 or 443) are more expensive than non-popular ones. MSP will ad-
vertise those listening Proxy through regional/geographic DNS record so that Peer
Node will resolve Mobile Node’s DNS name to a nearby incoming Proxy. Example
sequence is illustrated in Fig 3.4.
Since at any moment a Mobile Node can be behind a few Proxies, by nature
MSS Mobile Node is considered multi-homing. Its Peer Nodes generally will only see
one exposed network location of the Mobile Node, but it’s also possible a Peer Node
connects a Mobile Node through two or more different Proxies, especially when these
connections are setup long time apart.
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Figure 3.3.: Mobile Node Request Outgoing Proxy
A special scenario is both end-hosts are Mobile Nodes behind Proxies. Addition-
ally, they may belong to different MSPs which additionally limits the data to optimize
performance. When two Mobile Nodes belonging to same MSP, since MSP controller
knows locations of both MSP will choose one “pivot” point between them to optimize
for performance. If one Mobile Node knows the other end is also a Mobile Node, it
may leverage that to detect how far away the other Mobile Node is away from it. To
mitigate that MSP controller must set a lower bound of route path length, to avoid
choosing a pivot point too close to a Mobile Node. When Mobile Nodes belong to
different MSPs, both only exposed Proxy to the other side, and the traffic will go
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Figure 3.4.: Mobile Node Request Listening Proxy
through two Proxies. It might result in an inefficient trombone routing, unless MSPs
can cooperate to share some location knowledge.
3.2.4 Mobility Service Provider (MSP)
MSP manages a fleet of servers, called “Virtual Routers”, that are dynamically
allocated and released from public cloud service provider’s data centers. Each Virtual
Router can host multiple Proxies that relay different Mobile Nodes’ traffic, up to
server’s resource limit. Proxy also functions as profile server that serves Mobile Node’s
profile or DNS name lookups. For each Mobile Node, its Proxies together create an
overlay network to propagate control signals. At any moment Mobile Node has a
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master Proxy which is created or designated at a location close to Mobile Node. This
Proxy may only be used for relaying traffic with lower privacy setting or close by Peer
Node, but its major tasks are to manage the Proxy Overlay Network and delegate
communication between Mobile Node and SDN Controller. When Mobile Node moves
away from master Proxy, a new master Proxy will be created to take over the task.
A mobile user signs a single agreement with an MSP for leveraging the service to
protect his/her privacy. Powered by cloud even a single MSP could offer reasonable
location and performance coverage for most of places. On the other hand, different
MSPs will have their own strategy, strength, and goals. For mobile users want to
maximize privacy or cost/performance, they could choose to sign up for multiple
MSPs and use accordingly for different connections.
MSP manages its Virtual Router fleet similarly at larger scope with same strategy.
It removes unoccupied Virtual Router or creates new ones to maintain a healthy
load ratio and global presence. Public cloud enables this architecture that Virtual
Routers can be created/removed in almost all major areas around the world, in the
manner of on-demand that Virtual Router can be allocated or removed within minutes
dynamically.
Virtual Router
Virtual Routers are the real servers that host Proxies. It is called "virtual" be-
cause it is not physical server or routers, but instead applications/processes running
on virtual host, such as cloud host. That grants the capability of dynamically allo-
cating and removing capacity when needed. On the other hand, provisioning Virtual
Router is still time consuming (e.g. in terms of minutes rather than seconds), so
adjustment of Virtual Router allocation needs to plan ahead, depending on current
overall system load, and prediction from historical statistic. Proxy and profile servers
are applications running on Virtual Router. They are launched on demand: MSP
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controller create/remove them when needs, since creation and update can complete
immediately when requested, as shown in Fig 3.5
Figure 3.5.: Virtual Router
Multiple Proxies and Profile Servers shares a Virtual Router, as long as they don’t
have port conflict and the combined computation and bandwidth requirement doesn’t
exceed Virtual Router’s capacity. These Proxy and Profile Server applications run
independently so they can belong to the same Mobile Node or different Mobile Nodes.
MSP Endpoint Server are front end of MSP controller, and rendezvous point of
bootstrapping Mobile Host and Peer Host.
MSP has a logically centralized SDN-like controller which controls the allocation
of Virtual Routers, Proxies, Profile Servers, and network topology for each Mobile
Node’s Profile Server overlay network.
Controller maintains a distribution graph of all Proxies and Profile Servers of every
Mobile Node, and receives periodical report collected by Virtual Router. Therefore,
the total message is bound by number of Virtual Routers, although one message from
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a Virtual Router may contains multiple records regarding the state of Proxies and
Profile Servers running on it.
When Mobile Node wants to setup a new outgoing connection, it can either reuse
its current connected Proxies, or can request a new Proxy from SDN controller. Proxy
may also reject request for new connection if it’s overloaded or pending for removal,
and in this case, it will forward the request to SDN controller while telling Mobile
Node to wait for further instruction. Controller will examine location of Mobile Node
and its Peer Node, and assign a proxy according to availability and Mobile Node’s
SLA.
MSP controller periodically checks Virtual Routers’ load and dynamically launch
or remove virtual host to balance load. For each individual Mobile Node, SDN also
periodically updates its view of Mobile Node’s listening Proxies and Profile Servers,
and adjusts them according to recent statistic and pattern learnt from historical data.
3.2.5 MSP Infrastructure
There are two levels of fleet management operated by MSP: Proxy management
and Virtual Router management. Each Mobile Node’s Proxy fleet forms an overlay
control plane to monitor and aggregate metrics, and delegate signaling between Mo-
bile Node and MSP control plane. In addition to on-demand Proxy allocation, MSP
also periodically adjusts Proxy distribution to comply to user’s Service Level Agree-
ment(SLA). On a higher and broader level, MSP continuously monitors resource
utilization of its Virtual Routers, and dynamically allocate or remove capacity to
maintain a healthy availability. It employs similar philosophy as public Cloud service
provider that even individual customer usage can be volatile, the aggregated usage of
many users is relative stable and predictable. Additionally, the system benefit greatly
from on-demand resource allocation of public Cloud. These two are the keys to drive
down operation cost.
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The deployment of MSP server is resilient that it can shrink or extent in terms
of MSP’s will, and although distributed servers are deployed, MSS is still completely
apart from access networks. On one hand, MSP servers provide information access
via web services. Thus, an Internet user can always access desired information via
an ordinary Internet access. On the other hand, while server distribution and profile
replication devote to facilitate mobility management, it can also improve availability
of MSP and overall performance. The payment of subscribers for mobility manage-
ment and extra services would generate income for MSPs.
A S  A 1
A S  B 1 A S  B 2
A S  C 1 1
A S  C 2 A S  C 3
A S  B 3
A S  A 2
A S  C 4
A S  D 3A S  D 1
A S  D 2 A S  D 5
M S P  X
M S P  Y
M S P  Z
M S P  X
M S P  XM S P  X
M S P  X
A S  D 4
A S  T i e r - 1
A S  T i e r - 2
A S  T i e r - 3
Figure 3.6.: Examples of MSP coexistence and cooperation
For the minimum an MSP may have only one server such as MSP Y in Fig.3.6,
where AS D2 is covered both by MSP X and Y. All Y’s subscribers and peers can still
use its service from all other places of Internet, but only have the minimum overhead
when they are in AS D2. MSP Y prefers to serve a small group of people around a
certain area, such as a college or an enterprise. Hence MSP Y practically degrades
to become a rendezvous server with additional features such as PKI and relaying for
a group of users. Please note MSP Y can deploy more servers in AS D2 if it finds it
necessary. MSP Z is another MSP having servers deployed in AS D5. Suppose MSP
Y and Z belongs to nearby universities and they want to share each other’s services
for convenience. Hence, they could have a “peering” agreement to serve subscribers
of each other in their covered network.
49
Different MSPs can provide services to the same region simultaneously, and sub-
scribers will have the freedom of selection.
MSP Scaling
For one of the most extreme configurations, MSP can have only server which hosts
MSP control plane and also acts as Virtual Router hosting all Proxies as shown in
Fig 3.7. It can still serve Mobile Node at anywhere of Internet, although it degrades
performance into a static VPN server since all traffic will be proxied at this server.
The mobility support and privacy protection function still work without interruption,
though the performance apparently won’t be good, and privacy protection level will
be limited too. On the other hand, this configuration has the lowest operation cost,
and everyone has constant Internet connection can run their own MSP.
Figure 3.7.: Examples of MSP having only one server at an edge location
Another side of extreme config is MSP has ubiquitous servers everywhere, covering
every AS even subnet as shown in Fig 3.8. This is not realistic, but it will have best
performance since there won’t be any performance penalty and every network router
are mobility aware.
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Figure 3.8.: Examples of MSP having servers at every subnet
Cloud computing services already are being used to enhance various Internet func-
tionalities. For example, Amazon Route 53, built on Amazon Cloud Computing in-
frastructure, implements a DNS service. In this paper we extend the design of MSS
by using cloud computing platforms. Furthermore, we show that cloud-based archi-
tectures offer interesting tradeoffs among performance, security, privacy and economic
viability. Cloud computing not only can improve the technical performance of our
MSS, but most importantly can make much more economically attractive the MSS
to service providers. In particular cloud computing, with its elastic nature, lowers
the initial investment cost to start the business of MSS, and then keeps the cost scal-
able to the service demand. Therefore, the use of cloud computing in MSS will help
innovation, by keeping lower its initial and ongoing costs, as shown in Fig 3.9
3.3 Metric Definition
We propose three major metrics to quantify mobile node’s network location pri-
vacy, performance overhead, and corresponding operation cost. They are main targets
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Figure 3.9.: Examples of MSP having servers only in public cloud data centers
MSS system optimize for. To simplify multiple target optimization, we condensed
their definition and further added an aggregated metric definition, score.
In following discussion, we use m, n, and p to represent Mobile Node, Peer Node,
and Proxy Server; use M , N , and P represent corresponding set. Particularly pl and
po represents Listening Proxy and Outgoing Proxy.
3.3.1 Location Privacy
To protect location privacy from communication peers, traditional LBS (Location
Based Service) privacy metrics such as k-anonymity [21] doesn’t apply as the mobile
node is the single endpoint of connections to each peer, i.e. there is no “hiding” from
other identities. Fundamentally location privacy in communication can be quantified
by coherence of the Mobile Node’s actual location and location observed from Peer
Node side. To quantify privacy protection for network location in an end-to-end
communication scenario, we propose two metrics to measuring privacy: distance and
timing. In the case when Peer Node believes the exposed location is real location, the
uncertainty is 100%. However, since we cannot quantify how much Peer Node believe
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Mobile Node’s exposed location, we will always assume Peer Node knows Mobile
Node is behind a Proxy, and the proxy is on a strategy point that won’t introduce
unreasonable latency penalty, i.e. at some point along the route between Mobile node
and Peer Node. (Our metrics can also quantify privacy and performance of artificially
away Proxy as well, i.e. Proxy is selected far away from Mobile Node and Peer Node,
to create an illusion of being away for Peer Node, in cost of performance penalty.)
Distance
Distance, λ, is defined as how different the exposed network address is in term of
relative geographical distance, which is derived from the mapping of network address
to registered geographical locations. MSS only manages network communication so
location is determined by network address, which can be mapped to approximate
geographical locations. Other location information such as GPS coordinates are not
directly exposed by communication channel nor needed for general communication,
so they are out of scope of this research.
Distance stands for two different types of measurement in MSS: network distance
and geographical distance. Network distance can be measured by network hops of
end-to-end connection, or hops of network segments such as Autonomous System
(AS). Geographical distance is measured by the distance of corresponding geographic
locations of exposed network address and actual network address. This metric bears
similarity to distance error described in [106,107].
For example, a Mobile Node in New York City with IP address 128.59.a.b talks
with a Peer Node in Los Angeles with IP address 128.97.x.y, via a Proxy Server
in Indiana with IP address 129.79.m.n. The network distance is the hop distance
between 128.59.a.b and 129.79.m.n, and the geographic distance is about 700 miles
between New York City and Indianapolis.
Network distance is harder to quantify and compare. Network address, such as IP
address, are usually not uniformly distributed. It is already a hard job to estimate
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hop distances given two arbitrary IP addresses. Also, the IP address or AS exposed
may tell which organization owns the address, but this information generally not
reveal much personal information.
Geographic distance mapped from IP address is easier to quantify and relative
reliable. Even though there are cases that IP address incorrectly mapped to wrong
geographical locations (mostly depending on IP database), in reality this doesn’t
impair privacy. In our research we will assume all IP addresses can be correctly
mapped so our evaluation can rely on geographical distance for comparison.
In general, the larger the distance the better privacy. We use function dis(x, y)
to represent the approximate geographical location between network attach point x
and y. Then for a given combination of Mobile Node (m), Peer Node (n), and Proxy
Server (p), location privacy λm, n, p can be evaluated as:
λm, n, p =
dis(m, p)
dis(m,n)
as shown in Figure 3.10. On the other hand, the performance overhead φ is quantified
as:
φm, n, p = distance(m, p) + distance(p, n)− dis(m,n)
λ can equal to 0, between 0 and 1, equal to 1, or greater than 1. We use Figure
3.11 as reference to explain that:
• when no Proxy is leveraged, which means Mobile Node’s location is directly
exposed, then dis(m, p) = 0 and λ = 0.
• when Proxy is located somewhere between Mobile Node and Peer Node, 0 <
λ < 1, such as Scenario A and B in Figure 3.11. When dis(m, p) of Scenario A
and B are same, they have same distance privacy metric λ. On the other hand,
overhead φ of Scenario A is lower.
• when Proxy is located next to Peer Node, λ = 1. In this case overhead φ is
minimized to 0, and λ is 1.
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• when Proxy is located far away from between Mobile Node and Peer Node,
λ > 1, such as Scenario C in Figure 3.11. This is a valid, but not very reasonable
case that distance privacy is high and the overhead is also much higher.
Figure 3.10.: Distance Legend
The relation between distance λ and overhead φ is further illustrated Figure 3.12.
Assuming all Proxies Mobile Node connects has same distance dis(m, p), which forms
a circle around Mobile Node. dis(m, p) = dis(p, n) means Peer Node happens to be
on the circle as well. According to our equation all Proxies have same λ. On the
other hand, the Proxy which locates at the same location of Peer Node has minimum
φ, 0.
Distance metric can be evaluated for each connection/reconnection between Proxy
and Peer Node. Then for Mobile Node (m), its overall location privacy at a specific
time can be quantified as:
λm = minm∈M,p∈P (
distance(m, p)
distance(m,n)
)
Timing
Timing, δ , measures how correlated inferring mobile host’s movement (i.e. chang-
ing network attach point) versus real movements mobile host has. When no protection
mechanism is applied, adversary can know exactly when mobile host moves from one
location to another. Timing is measured by two types of correlations: number of real
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Figure 3.11.: Distance Scenarios
network address changes versus exposed network address changes during whole com-
munication, and difference of timestamp between real address changes and exposed
address changes. The larger the correlation, the better privacy. Timing privacy must
be evaluated for a period of time: during a time range, we assume Mobile Node moves
i times and Proxy changes j times. Function δ(x, y) is used to represent the times-
tamp difference between event x and y. Then for a Mobile Node m went through a
series of network address change events Em while its Peer Node n observed another
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Figure 3.12.: Distance Radius
series of change of Proxy Server events Ep. Then for a matched Mobile Node move
Emi and Proxy Server change E
p
j , the timing metric is evaluated as the time difference
of these two events:
δEmi ,E
p
j
=
∣∣tmi − tpj ∣∣
where t is event’s timestamp.
When evaluating timing privacy, we always use best match of Mobile Node move
events versus Proxy Server change events, to assume Peer Node has best knowledge
to leverage that correlation. In another word, we assume the worst case for Mobile
Node that each of its Proxy server change will be associated with its most recent
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move. Given that assumption and our δ equation, the overall timing privacy can be
evaluated as the sum of :
∆m,n,p =
∑
i∈Em,j∈Ep |time(x, y)|
j
The higher value of ∆m,n,p, the better timing privacy. The lower bound of ∆m,n,p
is 0 that for each Mobile Node move, Peer Node can detect its Proxy Server change at
exactly the same time, i.e. equivalent to no Proxy server. The upper bound is∞ that
when Proxy Server does not change at all, the exposed address becomes completely
static.
3.3.2 Cost
Cost, χ, is total operation cost of running all proxies and control plane controllers,
plus traffic/bandwidth cost if applies.
C =
∑
costproxy + costcontroller + costtraffic
Generally, the controller is relatively fixed fleet, and much smaller compared to proxy
fleet in all three setups. When implemented distributed it can actually be hosted
on existing Proxies. Therefore, we generally consider it as a constant. Traffic can
be either absorbed into Proxy cost in form of flat rate pricing or can be separated
charged to Mobile Node. Since the total traffic does not affect Proxy selection as long
as bandwidth requirement satisfies, we remove it from MSS Cost metric.
Single proxy cost is determined by its location, cloud service provider and cloud
host type, and bandwidth Proxy node provides. To unify different virtual host type
with different capacities, we define a Unit Stream Capacity (USC) as 1MB/S. There-
fore, we use virtual host’s hourly rate, a popular cloud service charging unit, as
dividend and number of USC it can support as divisor, to define a Proxy’s operation
cost:
χproxy =
hourlyrate
ProxyStreamCapacity
UnitStreamCapacity
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In each setup, MSS controller will use a Cost Database to lookup predicted running
cost for each candidate Proxy. Apparently keeping the database data precise and
up-to-date is important and MSP and MEC will have advantage here.
As result for a Mobile Node its overall operation cost is sum of all hour charge of
Proxy Servers and bandwidth cost, which MSS optimize the former.
χMN = χproxy ∗ hourproxy +
∑
χtraffic
3.3.3 Performance
Communication latency and bandwidth are two most perceptible measurement of
mobile user’s experience. Since generally proxy can always provide enough bandwidth
for a Mobile Node, MSS doesn’t consider bandwidth as a variance for performance
optimization, but rather an SLA requirement for MSS control plane to choose Proxy
for Mobile Node. Round Trip Time (RTT) of traffic between Mobile Node and its
Peer Node directly and via Proxy are the major performance difference MSS optimizes
for. It is defined as proxy overhead, the difference between direct connect RTT and
via proxy RTT, that smaller means better performance.
µ = RTT (m, p) +RTT (p, n)−RTT (m,n)
3.3.4 Score
Score, S, is one aggregated metric unifying performance and privacy metric, based
on 5 inputs: Mobile Node location, Peer Node location, Proxy candidate location,
acceptable minimum performance, and acceptable minimum privacy. The value range
of Score is between 100 and -100, while any value below or equal 0 means the candidate
does not satisfy minimum requirement.
S =
maxµ − µ
maxµ + µ
∗ kµ + λm, n, p−minλ
λm, n, p+minλ
∗ kλ
k is weighing constant that the sum of all k equals to 100%.
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Score can be further combined with Cost as:
S =
maxµ − µ
maxµ + µ
∗ kµ + λm, n, p−minλ
λm, n, p+minλ
∗ kλ − χproxy ∗ kχ
3.4 Connection Scenarios
In this section we will discuss typical scenarios that how a mobile node connects to
its peer nodes through MSS for privacy protection and additional mobility support.
Fig 3.13 shows a simplified illustration of one cellular provider with two Radio Access
Networks (RAN) at different geographic locations connecting Internet through their
gateways, while two RANs are physically isolated but also directly connected through
private link. It is an abstraction of a typical cellular provider that has many RANs
vastly deployed covering almost everywhere, either independently or through collab-
oration. Usually these RANs are also privately connected so direct traffic between
RANs are routed via private links for better security, cost, and performance.
A user carries a cellphone deployed with MSS agent and connects public Internet
through cellular provider’s data network. Initially it connects to Base Station A1
in RAN A. It communicates with a few Internet peer nodes: two web servers and
another peer user. Cellular data network will assign an internally routable IP address
to cellphone for routing traffic within cellular data network. For traffic going out,
without using MSS or VPN this traffic will exit from Internet gateway selected by
RAN A controllers, generally the one close to its current Base Station such as Gateway
G1 in figure. The public IP address of this gateway will be the exposed network
location of the cellphone, which can be approximately mapped to its geo-location.
When a pre-selected VPN server is utilized to proxy all traffic, network packets will
still exit from Gateway G1 but then redirect at VPN server. The exposed IP address
will be the one from VPN server, which does not correlate with cellphone’s real
location. The overall latency overhead of proxying is determined by the distance
between gateway and VPN server and the distances between VPN server and peer
nodes. When MSS with MEC is utilized, multiple proxy points are selected that all
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of them are allocated closing to traffic target. For example: Gateway G1 will be
selected for Web Server X, Gateway G3 will be selected for Peer User, and a Virtual
Router within same public Cloud data center of Web Server Y will be selected for
it. The exposed public IP address are different for each peer, and not correlates with
cellphone’s real location either. Although Gateway G1 is selected, it is just because it
is close to Web Server X, regardless of cellphone’s location (it will be further illustrated
in following scenarios when user moves). The overall latency overhead is minimum to
none since all proxies locate on or near optimal routes. Connections between proxies
and peer nodes are ordinary TCP/IP connections that bound to IP addresses, while
the connections between cellphone (via MSS agent) and proxies are identity based
and resilient to soft or hard handover [105]. Both VPN and MSS will incur some
extra operation cost.
Figure 3.13.: Mobile node roams
When user moves a distance the cellphone handover connection to Base Station
A2, which still belongs to same RAN A. It may receive a new internal IP address or
61
changing Internet gateway, though cellular data network may try to minimize impact
to existing connections by keep current Internet gateway unchanged, with protocols
such as Proxy Mobile IP [108]. Therefore, the original exposed IP address will remain
while latency and operation cost will increase a bit. For VPN nothing changes, except
it also suffers the increased network latency from cellular network. If cellular network
decides to change Internet gateway, VPN still protects cellphone’s real network ad-
dress, but ongoing connections may be interrupted, and the latency change depends
on whether new gateway is closer or further from VPN server. MSS with MEC will
instruct cellular provider always assign most efficient internal IP address and Internet
Gateway, without need of PMIP. Proxies in MEC will handover ongoing connections
to the new internal IP address, while proxies in public Cloud will handover connec-
tion to a new gateway closet to cellphone. The exposed public IP address remain
unchanged and ongoing connections are preserved. Still the overall latency overhead
is minimum to none since all proxies are still on or near optimal routes.
When user moves longer distance eventually it will move to RAN B and connects
to Base Station B1, and cellular network has to change its Internet gateway to G3. All
IP based connections will be disrupted, and without protection remote peer nodes will
be able to detect cellphone’s movement and new location by its new exposed public
IP address. For VPN all connections between VPN server and previous gateway will
be changed to new gateway G3. It still protects cellphone’s real network address, and
the new latency overhead is determined by location of gateway G3. For MSS with
MEC new optimal routes between cellphone and proxies will replace old ones. Privacy
protection and latency overhead will remain at the same level as before, regardless of
where user moves to.
In everyday use there is another typical scenario: vertical handovers between
cellular data network and Wi-Fi. It is analogous to above discussed scenarios that
exposed network location changes. Without protection it could pose higher privacy
risk since public IP address fromWi-Fi network usually to be more specific to location.
VPN will provide same protection while latency overhead is still determined by the
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distance triangle. MSS with MEC once again provides best privacy protection with
minimum latency overhead. When peer node in inside cellular data network or in
same MEC, MSS with MEC will have optimal performance since traffic are proxied
at network switch connecting peer node. VPN server on the other hand will have
the worst performance among three because traffic will have to traverse in and out of
cellular data network.
3.4.1 When both ends employ MSS
When both ends employ MSS, MSS can still protect both of their network privacy,
but could trade off with higher latency overhead. Depending on whether they use
same MSS Service Provider(MSP) there could be two different scenarios:
Figure 3.14.: Both ends employ MSS
• Peer Node uses a different MSP. This is the generic scenario. Mobile Node has
a few listening Proxy allocated at different places. When Peer Node A want
to connect Mobile Node (or the other way around by switching their roles) as
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shown in Fig 3.14, it can only resolve to Mobile Node ’s current listening proxies’
network addresses. Due to Mobile Node’s de facto multi-homing, Peer Node A
could receive one location that is close to where it initiates the lookup request,
or even receiving multiple locations. In this case Peer Node A will have to
choose one (or a few) deemed best for it, without guarantee of low performance
overhead. Unfortunately, this is an inevitable tradeoff of maximizing privacy
protection.
• Same MSP optimization mode. When Peer Node B uses same MSP and both
agree to connect on identity, the connection initiator (Mobile Node in Fig 3.14
will ask MSP to allocate an outgoing Proxy to Peer Node B’s identity, rather
than an IP address. MSP in this case will allocate a single Proxy functioning
both as incoming and outgoing for Peer Node B and Mobile Node, respectively.
This Proxy will be selected around the middle point of the optimal route as
long as privacy SLA allows. It functions like a “pivot” point that doesn’t need
to change frequently since the optimal route will not depart from it much while
privacy is well protected. Additionally, when needed, such as performance over-
head deteriorates, new Proxy can be created and MSP will ask both ends to
migrate their connections since both connections are mobility capable. This
mode can mitigate the performance issue in above different MSP scenario while
still protect network privacy at same level.
3.5 Privacy Attack Models
We assume Alice, the attack target, carrying a mobile device with her all the
time so that the network/geolocation of her Mobile Node is an approximate of Al-
ice’s geolocation. The adversary Bob wants to know Alice’s current geolocation and
location history so he can take advantage of that. The more precise location history
Bob knows about Alice, the more sophisticated attack he will be able to craft. In
following sections we list 4 major distinct attack models that Bob can leverage to
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attack on Alice’s privacy. Note that different attack models could be combined in
certain circumstances to further enhance attack effect as describe in attack scenarios.
3.5.1 Direct Connection Attack
By accomplishing this type of attack Bob can successfully directly connect to
Alice’s device, and even maintain a connection to it. Attack succeeds when connection
can be setup successfully so that Bob can acquire current location of Alice. For
protocols only bound to network location, such as TCP, adversary might need to
perform further communication to confirm Alice’s device identity. Identity bound
protocols, such HIP, may give Bob enough information for identify verification with
just connection attempt. There is one precondition of this attack that Bob has to
know Alice’s network location prior to connect.
3.5.2 Location Registry Attack
By accomplishing this type of attack Bob can indirectly acquire Alice’s network
location from a registration service, such as DNS, without direct interaction with
Mobile Node. A successful attack will reveal one temporary contact point (not nec-
essarily real network location of Mobile Node such as when Proxy is leveraged), and
give Bob chance to further verifying by attempting direct connection. There is one
precondition of this attack that Bob must know Alice’s network identity in prior.
3.5.3 Historical Location Attack
By accomplishing this type of attack Bob can collect a sequential list of where Alice
has been, which can be used to profile Alice or aid other type of attacks. Sequence here
is important as more precise the location sequence, the better resolution of profiling
adversary can achieve. However, a location list with completely wrong sequence may
still be useful to Bob to some extent. The preconditions of this attack are that: 1)
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Bob must know Alice’s network identity in prior; 2) Bob is able to retrieve a subset
list of Alice’s location history.
3.5.4 Location Change Timing Attack
By accomplishing this type of attack Bob knows Alice’s device handover time, i.e.
when Alice moves from one location to next location. This attack by itself does not
reveal privacy that much, but when it’s combined with other attack models Bob can
dramatically increase profiling precision and multiply privacy attack damage.
3.6 Privacy Attack Scenarios
3.6.1 Adversary directly connects to Mobile Node
The simplest yet most impactful attack on Alice’s privacy is that Bob can keep
a live connection directly to Alice’s Mobile Node device. Therefore, Bob will be
able to know exactly Alice’s network attachment location which can be mapped to
geolocation. Also, Bob will know when Alice’s address changes. Having that Bob not
only know the real time location of Alice, but also can create a history timeline of
Alice’s movement. This is combination of Attack Model 1, 3, and 4.
When Bob knows Alice’s real-world identity, with Alice’s real time location and
historical location information he can launch all kinds of sophisticated attack or even
threatening Alice’s physical world safety. Without knowing Alice’s real-world identity
Bob can still easily profile Alice by knowing her unique location history. Note that
Bob does not need to be a friend of Alice to able to trace her. Bob can be a website
Alice is used to visit, or just a script embedded in an advertisement.
3.6.2 Adversary resolve Mobile Node’s address via a Location Service
Based on Scenario 1, assume Alice enhances her security by deploying a local
firewall on her Mobile Node to refuse connection from Bob. This would to some
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extend prevent Bob to acquire real time location information of Alice. However,
there could be some public location service, such as DNS, that can be used to resolve
Alice’s identity to her location in order for Alice to be connected. Bob can keep
sending location resolution requests to this service to collect Alice’s location history.
This is combination of Attack Model 2 and 3.
Compared to Attack Scenario 1 Bob’s tracking capability is limited: first Bob
won’t be able to get deterministic real time location of Alice since he cannot directly
connect to her; second since the location registration is always lag behind, and some-
times protected by throttling mechanism, Bob will not perceive precise timing or even
complete location history of Alice. In this case it only accomplishes Attack Model 2.
When the registration service has access control and Bob is not whitelisted to resolve
Alice’s address, he will not be able to track Alice. However, maintaining a whitelist
is difficult and expensive, as modern Internet host usually have tens or hundreds of
open connections to web servers and other hosts at any moment. On the other hand,
if Bob is allowed to connect to Alice or allowed to resolve Alice’s location, Alice’s
exposure is no different than Attack Scenario 1.
3.6.3 Adversary connects through Proxy moving along with Mobile Node
Alice can protect her location privacy while keep connectivity by sending/receiving
traffic through a Proxy. In this case Bob can communicate with Alice at any time,
but only the Proxy location is exposed to Bob. Bob will only observe Proxy’s location
history, and under most circumstances Bob will not be able to detect whether Alice
is behind a Proxy. This is combination of Attack Model, 3, and 4.
A typical example is cellular data network. When Alice uses cellular network
to access Internet, usually Alice’s Mobile Host will be assigned a private network
address that is routable within carrier’s network, and Alice will have to route her
traffic through her cellular carrier’s Internet gateway for Internet access. For Bob he
will only see Internet gateway’s network address as Alice’s exposed network address.
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In this case the carrier’s Internet gateway becomes a de facto proxy. When Alice
roams away new private network address will be assigned. When this new private
address associates with another Internet gateway which are usually close to the cell
Alice is in, Bob will observe connection interruption and location change.
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4 DETAIL DESIGN AND VALIDATION
We designed system to implement architecture we proposed in Chapter 3. In this
chapter we will describe system design and show how it can protect privacy while
provide mobility support efficiently. The final system design evolved from our previous
work that is based on all on-premise servers forming a continuous overlay network
and aims to only enhance mobility support [99], to designs based on public cloud
servers composing distributed system protecting network location privacy in addition
to mobility support [100,102], and next to integrating MEC into MSP Virtual Router
fleet [103,104]. In this chapter we will only present the complete final version.
4.1 Incorporating MEC
The incorporation of MEC provides MSS capability to greatly expand geolocation
presence and thus reduce performance overhead. It also provides opportunities for
MSS to reduce system operation cost. In fact with MEC MSS elevates its network
paradigm from edge of network to network core.
Public Cloud service is the most crucial enabler for MSS: with it MSP can allocate
Proxies on-demand all over the world, to maintain an optimal operation state satis-
fying both its customer requirement and financial sustainability. However, there are
also limitations of utilizing public Cloud host to proxy traffic. First, public Clouds
are not truly ubiquitous that their data centers are only available near selective ma-
jor cities. For example, until now there are barely more than ten of metropolitan
areas in the US has major public Cloud data centers nearby, and less than 100 edge
locations national wide combined. In other countries the density is even less. Sec-
ond, hosting Proxy in public Cloud may have advantage connecting to web sites also
hosted in public Cloud, but for Peer Nodes outside Cloud, the Proxy is still at another
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edge of network. Traffic going through multiple ISP and boundary creates difficulty
to maintain consistency and keep SLA. Third but not the last, Virtual Routers are
mostly used for network I/O, which leaves large amount of computation and storage
capability that MSP purchase but may not able to fully consume.
MEC provides answers to above three issues. MEC’s physical presence is far be-
yond public Cloud data centers that cellular providers already deployed their networks
and routers to almost everywhere. With MEC MSS can even find “next-door” proxy
for every Peer Node. These RANs are also generally owned by same provider and
connected with globally managed private links, which can provide better QoS than
public Internet. Additionally, those network controllers and routers which implement
MEC are originally specialized of handling network traffic. MSS can leverage MEC
to augment performance and reduce operation cost, as illustrated in Fig 4.1. To
incorporate MEC, MSS designs are changed in following areas:
1. Proxy application. Proxy is changed that can directly run as MEC applica-
tion where VM is abstracted out from platform interface. Otherwise Virtual
Router will still be allocated as ordinary VM on mobile edge host. Both their
functionality and role remain the same.
2. Specialized Proxy. When MEC allows access to RAN especially managing cus-
tomize routing rules, Proxy is replaced by routing table entries and/or packet
repeater. In this case Virtual Router will reduce to an application listening to
MSP signals and accordingly maintaining routing rules and policies of the net-
work device it runs on. This mode reduces operation cost, and can also improve
performance due to less traffic processing.
3. Network representation. In the simple mode where MSP does not have deep
integration with cellular network, MSP just treats MEC Edge Clouds as equiva-
lent of public Cloud data centers with less capacity. When MSP can have deeper
integration, such as routing traffic within cellular network, MSP’s network graph
distinguishes cellular network and public Internet where two network connects
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through multiple Internet gateways. In this mode any connection cross two net-
work boundary must go through one selected Internet gateway, and this gateway
implements Proxy if privacy metric meets requirement. Otherwise proxy will
have to allocated in a public Cloud data centers and gateway will be chosen at
the place with minimum cost only.
4. Proxy allocation algorithm. MSP gives priority to MEC when allocating Proxy,
but will retreat to public Cloud when region’s MEC is not sufficient either in
availability or performance. So a Mobile Node’s Proxies could consist of MEC
routing rules, MEC application, and public Cloud hosted ones.
5. On Mobile Node agent remains mostly the same, except it can now distinguish
connection based on private or public IP address and manage accordingly.
Figure 4.1.: Examples of MSP leveraging MEC
When MSS can have deeper integration with MEC (or cellular provider imple-
ments MSS) it gains more benefits besides the operation cost saving. For example,
when MSP use MEC Edge Cloud as ordinary public Cloud, traffic from Mobile Node
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will first exit RAN into public Internet, go into another RAN to reach Proxy, exit
second RAN, and finally reach Peer Node. As comparison a deeper integrated MSP
will directly route traffic within cellular data network and exit at an Internet gateway
very close to Peer Node. On the other hand, in fact cellular provider has inherent
advantages becoming an MSP. For example, mobility Management is already one core
functionality of cellular network. MSS’s functionality such as tracking Mobile Node’s
location, looking up Mobile Node, replicating mobility information across network,
etc. can be easily adapt from cellular network’s similar functions. It also benefits
MSS users since they don’t even need to share their real network location to anyone
else. Cellular provider becomes the only one knowing their network location (and
they already know at the first place), a single one-to-one contract for mobile users is
all they need to protect their network privacy completely.
Moreover, with deeper integration MSS can provide more options of SLAs for
privacy protection and quality of service. For example:
• Different portion of routing traffic within cellular network and outside in public
Internet implies different operation cost and QoS. A user could pay more to
route traffic as much as possible within cellular network for not only minimizing
public Internet exposure, but also more consistent performance.
• Cellular providers can allocate proxy from a larger group of device candi-
dates, not limited to MEC Edge Cloud open for public. For example, those
core/backbone switches are good candidate as they resides in the center of cel-
lular network topology therefore having minimum performance penalty.
• Number of proxies, especially for multi-homing users. Since the cost of running
proxy is greatly reduced and generally cellular provider have more distributed
resources available, user can be given wider range of choice to find the sweat
spot of cost versus number of listening proxies.
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4.2 Security Examine
In this section we briefly examine other security implications of MSS with MEC,
besides the location privacy protection. We assume Alice, the attack target, carrying
a mobile device with her all the time. Bob is an adversary tries to compromise Alice’s
communication via any possible means.
• Anonymity. In MSS with MEC every communication is bound to identity,
such as cellular number, email address, or HIP’s identity. All end-to-end com-
munication is protected by encryption so no one other than end host can infer
traffic content. However, there could be one special case that Proxy is in-
structed by Mobile Node to terminate encryption channel between it and Peer
node for any reason, then Proxy itself will have access to communication traffic
temporarily.
• Unlinkability.This is one of the major defenses MSS provides. All Alice’s
communications are distributed through different Proxies, which is dynamically
assigned and also shared by many other mobile users. By observing one or a
few Alice’s Proxies will not be able to detect Alice’s involvement with specific
remote peer, nor whether Proxies are used by Alice.
• Undetectability. This is not main goal of MSS design. Bob could resolve to
Alice’s Proxies if Alice decides to advertise her identity and waiting for incoming
connection request.
• Repudiation. It is up to Mobile Node’s choice of end-to-end protocol when
communicate with Peer Node. Between Mobile Node and Proxy repudiation is
not critical and the end-to-end authentication and encryption are used to prove
identity and sign communication. Mobile Node can choose to log or audit the
packets it sends and receive from Proxy.
• confidentiality. When Mobile Node employs public/private key based end-to-
end encryption protocol to Peer Node, no one other than two ends including
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Proxy, can infer the communication content. The communication can be further
protected by employ similar end-to-end encryption between Mobile Node and
Proxy when tunneling traffic so that no one else can infer what Peer Node is
instructed to connect to.
4.2.1 Protect Against Attacks
MSS system enables ubiquitous mobility support while protects Mobile Node’s
privacy. For the four attack models we described:
• Defend Direct Connection Attack: all connections are indirect and through
Proxy. So Bob will never be able to infer Alice’s network address while being
able to talk with her.
• Defend Location Registry Attack: all location registry only points to Alice’s
Proxy locations. Even if when Bob can acquire multiple Proxies’ locations, he
cannot infer Alice’s location since these Proxies are setup near to Alice’s Peer
rather than Alice.
• Defend Historical Location Attack: Bob cannot acquire a list of Alice’s real
network location history either through communication with Alice or through
registry.
• Defend Location Change Timing Attack: Bob cannot directly detect when Alice
changes network location as the connection between him and Proxy is always
unchanged.
4.3 Allocation Algorithms
There are two types of management need allocation algorithm:
• Mobile Node’s overlay network management. For each Mobile Node, its overlay
network summarizes all related metrics: 1) Cost, sum of Proxies(online and
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standby) determines overlay network’s running cost; 2) load ratio of computa-
tion and network resource for each Proxy; 3) Performance, communicate latency
and bandwidth usage for each Peer Connection; 4) Privacy, exposed distance
and timing metric for each Peer Connection; 5) other attributes of Mobile Node,
such as SLA, payment, authentication info, access control, etc. Having all these
data, the overlay network makes decision on when and how to adjust Proxy,
and which Proxy to take outgoing traffic or becoming Listening Proxy, so that
SLA can be meet while running cost is minimized.
• MSP’s region/data center management. MSP can optimize each region/data
center individually as there is not much correlation of fleet management across
region/data center(when there is, a third type of optimization for MSP to glob-
ally reduce running cost or improve performance across region/data centers
could be added, such as by altering baseline parameter of a region, but we will
limit our scope and not discuss it in this paper.). Within a region/data center,
MSP needs to keep a healthy load ratio by dynamically add or remove Virtual
Router, and by selecting proper Virtual Router to host new Proxy, while keep-
ing running cost low. Running cost could be capped and in this situation the
optimization algorithm needs to gracefully degrade by balancing load evenly.
4.3.1 Zone
For better scaling the MSP fleets are divided into multiple level of Zones, somewhat
analogous to BGP Autonomous System but with hierarchy levels. Zone hierarchy
forms a multi-root tree with attributes:
• A leaf Zone is a Zone does not contain other Zones.
• Leaf Zone is the minimum unit that MSP can allocate Virtual Router.
• For a given Internet address, there is one Leaf Zone and multiple non-leaf Zone
containing it.
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• A Zone can be contained in one higher hierarchy level Zone, which is considered
as its “Parent” Zone.
• A Zone can only overlap with its parent or ancestors.
Zone boundaries are generally decided according to geographic location as well as
network topology, and the main use of Zone is for divide and conquer and global op-
timization to paralleled localized problem. Therefore, MSP can apply special zoning
criteria to better match its interest.
4.3.2 Mobile Node Proxy Allocation Algorithms
Outgoing Proxy
When Mobile Node (MN) initiates connection to peer, it will submit a request
to MSP for new outgoing Proxy. Given a MN already has a few outgoing Proxies,
MSP can either create new Proxy at a Virtual Router (VR) already hosting this MN’s
proxies, or choose a VR not currently hosting MN’s Proxy. For cloud and MEC based
system the difference is trivial, as hosting multiple Proxies for a MN at the same VR
only saves the update signaling when MN acquires a new network address. Therefore
we simply algorithms to not take “reuse“ VR into computation, and requesting new
outgoing Proxy is simplified as independent operation.
To creating a new outgoing Proxy, there are three main constrains: privacy level,
performance, and cost. Their definition and calculation are described in Sec 3.3,
and the goal is to find the Proxy location having highest privacy and performance
and lowest cost. This multi-target optimization is implemented by converting and
merging numeric metric into a combined “score” metric, as describe in Sec 3.3, and
MSP will select the Proxy with highest score. MN can also specify particular privacy
or performance constrain, so the Proxy candidates will be filtered first to remove
Proxy either not satisfying Privacy or Performance requirements. Similarly MSP
could also filter based on cost. If after filtering no candidate is left, MSP will setup
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down filtering requirement per customer’s SLA and negotiate with MN, or eventually
fails the Proxy request if there is no location satisfying the requirement.
The allocation can also be constrained by Virtual Router’s availability, i.e. if there
is enough computation and bandwidth available at selected place to host this new
outgoing Proxy. However this algorithm will always receive current fleet availability
as input, which is managed by MSP using algorithm presented in Sec 4.3.3.
To scale the algorithm, the available Proxy locations are divided into hierarchy
of zones, with the view as of multi-root tree. Algorithm will starting from top level
of hierarchy which has small number of large coverage zones. After each run at one
hierarchy level, only top 3 zones with highest scores will be selected and fed into
next level search, until reach bottom level and find Proxy. The computation of Proxy
scores in a selected Zone happen in the Zone SDN controller, and the summarize
happens at the MSP server serving proxy creation request.
One example algorithm implementation is listed as in Algorithm 1. It uses a
priority queue to store candidate , run a Breath-First search from top level zones.
Listening/Incoming Proxy
Mobile Node needs to pre-allocate Listening/Incoming Proxy if it wants to receive
connections from its Peer Nodes. Since Peer Nodes’ locations are unknown when
setting up Listening Proxy, the score evaluation will based on prediction either made
by customer manually (e.g. list potential Peer Node subnets or appoint locations
where MN wants to have Listening Proxies) or computed by MSP using historical
statistic.
Different than Outgoing Proxy which is allocated on-demand per connection, Lis-
tening Proxy allocation runs periodically for each MN, and each run generates the
full distribution of all Listening Proxies. For a MN wants to listen on multiple ports,
each port runs its own allocation and have independent Listening Proxy fleet.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm of Allocating Outgoing Proxy
Require: MN location locMN , Peer Node location locPN , SLA,
Create Priority Queue zones with size limit 3, sort based on score
Create Priority Queue candidates with size limit 3, sort based on score
for all z in top level Zones do
sz ← score(z, locMN , locPN , SLA)
zones.push(z, sz)
end for
while zones is not empty do
z ← zones.pop()
if z is Virtual Router then
candidates.push(z, sz)
else
newZones ← requestCandidates(z, locMN , locPN , SLA)
for all nz in newZones do
snz ← score(nz, locMN , locPN , SLA)
zones.push(nz, snz)
end for
end if
end while
if candidates is not empty then
Fine sorting candidates based on extra requirement
Return top of candidates
else
Failed the request
end if
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The cost of setting up and tearing down Listening Proxy are considered as trivial
for simplicity in our research, so as result each allocation will not take existing Lis-
tening Proxy distribution into account. For existing Listening Proxies having active
connections but excluded from next iteration fleet, they will keep running but will
not accept new connections, and terminate once current connections close.
Since Listening Proxy are expensive due to port is exclusive resource, allocation
algorithm requires the maximum number of Listening Proxy, along with a list of
expected addresses or Zones. MN’s location is also required to evaluate and satisfy
privacy SLA if specified. The first stage of algorithm is to merge expected Zones until
number of Zones is less or equal to allowed Listening Proxies. The second stage of
algorithm goes the opposite direction to search for the best location hosting Listening
Proxy in each selected Zones. The example algorithm implementation is listed as in
Algorithm 2.
4.3.3 MSP Server Fleet Allocation Algorithms
Each MSP needs to manage two different fleets: 1) control plane fleet that acts as
controller managing system states and as webservice serving requests from customers;
2) data plane fleet that is composed of Virtual Routers carrying Proxies. Apparently,
the latter fleet is much larger scale and dynamic, and contributes majority of MSP’s
operation cost. Additionally, since Virtual Routers are just process running on MSP’
servers, the same servers can be used to run control plane controllers. Therefore the
allocation algorithm will only use data plane usage (historical and future prediction)
as input for the allocation algorithm and ignores control plane usage.
The fleet allocation algorithm needs to determine where to strategically put on-
demand servers hosting Virtual Routers, so that all potential Proxy request can be
accommodated until next run, while during this period the load on each server can
maintain in healthy range. Since the allocated servers and resided Virtual Routers
will serve all MNs, the algorithm will only optimize against the expected Peer Node.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm of Allocating Listening/Incoming Proxy
Require: Port number p, allowed Proxy count maxlp, MN location locMN , List of
locations loclistPN , SLA,
Create empty set zones
for all locPN in loclistPN do
zones ← the hosting Zone of locPN
end for
while size(zones) > maxlp do
Find two Zones zm and zn in zones having minimum distance
zones.remove(zm)
zones.remove(zn)
zx ← lowest common ancestor of zm and zn
zones.add(zx)
end while
for all zone in zones do
Create empty set p
for all children Zone zonec in zone do
pc ← expectedPeeraddress/ZoneinzonecexpectedPeeraddress/Zoneinzone
p.add(pc)
end for
if largest pc in p is greater than threshold then
repeat search in zonec
else
allocate proxy in zonec
end if
end for
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Apparently MSPs that only employ on-premise servers will not need this allocation
adjustment as all servers are static. MSP run allocation algorithm periodically to
ensure it maintains a healthy presence and server load.
first step of algorithm is to summarize count of potential Proxies in each Zone.
Then for MSP employing hybrid fleet, i.e. having on-premise servers, those servers
will be first employed to serve nearby Zones’ Proxy requests until reaching their
capacity limit, or depleting nearby Proxy requests (where nearby is defined by a
network distance threshold). However either way these on-premise servers will not be
considered again in the second step of computing server allocated from public Cloud
Service data centers and Mobile Edge Computing gateways/switches. The reason is
that this optimization is a NP-complete problem for a general graph since it needs to
consider all possible solutions and replica layout are highly dependent(i.e. the setup
of a replica at a specific location is based on the existence and position of all other
replicas) [109], so optimization is usually conducted on reduced topology, i.e. a tree
abstracted from general graph, and this optimization problem can be reduced to a
p−median problem in Discrete Location Theory, which can be solved by using existing
dynamic programming (DP) solutions. We present an optimization algorithm based
our previous published in [99, 100] which is based on the off-line optimal algorithm
Tian and Cox described in [110]. A pseudo root Zone is added to the multi-room
Zone trees.
Example algorithm is listed in Algorithm 3. It takes onPremZones as Zones
hosting on-premise servers; onDemandZones as Zones that can launch on-demand
servers; loclistPN as list of Peer Node, number of connections to/from them, and capacity
requirement of each connection; budget as total budget MSP can spend on on-demand
server, and serverCost(zone) as cost and serverCap(zone) as capacity of on-demand
server in corresponding Zone. β(i, j) is the element to measure the cost to Proxy
serving Peer Node from node j at node i; α(i, Tj) is the optimal cost of serving
subtree Tj, including Peer Node connections originate from Tj when served by a
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Proxy at node i; and α(Tj) is the optimal cost of serving subtree Tj when Proxies are
all within.
Algorithm 3 MSP Server Fleet Allocation Algorithm
Require: onPremZones, onDemandZones, loclistPN
create empty set r
for all onPremZone in onPremZones do
remove PN with distance and capacity threshold from loclistPN
r.add(onPremZone)
end for
for all zone in onDemandZones do
Sum up PN requests for zone loclistPN
end for
Calculate β matrix for each pair of zones.
Compute α of each leaf zone.
Starting from bottom zones until root, do:
for all j As a non-leaf zone do
for all i As each other zone do
Compute α(i, Tj)
end for
Compute α(Tj)
end for
r.addAll(serversofpseudorootZone))
4.4 Protection for IoT Devices
For IoT devices that are directly connect Internet through cellular data network
and capable to deploy MSS agent, they can leverage MSS to protect their network
privacy just like ordinary Mobile Node. However, for IoT devices that are resource
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constrained or not capable to deploy MSS agent, MSS has a special protection model
for them: adding one additional Master Proxy which is allocated close to IoT devices
and this Master Proxy will function as IoT devices’ MSS agent, as shown in Fig 4.2.
IoT devices just need to configure passing all their traffic through this Master Proxy,
for example set as their network gateway. Master Proxy will function just like an MSS
agent that setup connections to Peer Node through outgoing and incoming Proxies.
When IoT devices moves, Master Proxy will move along with it to keep a minimum
distance in order to minimize performance overhead.
Particularly IoT devices within same subnet or behind same public Internet attach
point can share same Master Proxy. For example, for a smart home, cameras, smart
power switches, garage controls, etc. all can direct all their traffic to this nearby
Master Proxy. For cellular network with MEC, this master Proxy could provide
another layer of protection that other local MEC application will not be able to
probe the remote sides of connections from IoT devices.
Figure 4.2.: IoT Devices leverage a Master Proxy
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4.5 Simulation
To validate our design and algorithm we setup simulation trying to mimic real
world topology and traffic pattern. Simulations were conducted on a topology gen-
erated by Inet3 [111] topology generation tool. With it we created 5000 nodes on
a 2D plain with dimension 10000 of 10000 to emulate a simplified view of Internet.
Each node represents a public Internet subnet that is publicly routable and reachable.
Their coordinates represent their geographic location, while hops between two nodes
represent the network distance. Due to the mobility nature, every event in simulation
has a timestamp and all events are merged onto same timeline during one simulation
iteration. The Maximum event timestamp is 2000.
During this period, Mobile Node perform a random walk in 2D plane and con-
nects to the geographic nearest node as its Internet attaching point. This simulates
an Internet mobile user roams across different networks and uses nearby gateway as
its exposed Internet address. Each Mobile Node randomly moves 20 times at ran-
dom timestamp. For each Mobile Node we create a pool of 20 Peer Nodes, and their
locations are randomly selected from the 5000 nodes. These are Peer Nodes either
initiating connections to Mobile Node, or receiving connection coming from Mobile
Node. For this simulation we do not count connection time but only use location at-
tributes of one connection to compute metrics such as performance or privacy. Each
Peer Node can have 1 to 10 connections during the simulation period, and timestamp
is also uniformly random generated. On the other hand Mobile Nodes randomly nom-
inate 3 locations for hosting listening proxies to receive incoming connection. This
design is trying to simulate one ordinary Internet mobile use’s average day access pat-
tern. We generate traces of 100 Mobile Nodes and compare average of Mobile Node’s
metrics, to counter the potential skew caused by accidental non-uniform randomness.
We run simulation to compare MSS versus other models. The comparison is based
on view of individual customer’s privacy and performance metrics when one customer
moves while communicates with its peers. Models include:
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1. Typical VPN user. We simulate by selecting one static Proxy Server selected
around the middle of the optimal router between Mobile Node and its first Peer
node. It does give favor to first Peer Node but statistically it does not make
difference since we have 19 other Peer nodes for simulation.
2. Typical cell data mobile user. We simulate by keeping a proxy server that
follows Mobile Node move (randomly picked within 2 hops of Mobile Node’s
attaching point, and re-selects when Mobile Node’s access point moving away
from attaching point). This proxy server simulates the Internet Gateway which
relays a cellular data network user’s IP packets.
3. MSS based on public Cloud only. Among the 5000 nodes we randomly select
10 “seed” nodes that are not too close to each other to represent public Cloud
service provider’s data centers. We randomly “grow” the data center footprint
by tainting nodes directly connect to it in 2 to 3 hoops, to simulate public
cloud data center covering large fleets of servers and owning large amount of IP
addresses.
4. MSS based on MEC. Among the 5000 nodes we exclude leaf nodes (those have
only one connection to neighbors) and core nodes (those have highest number
of connections to neighbors), and all the rest are candidate of MEC nodes. This
simulate the ubiquitous presence of cellular data network and potential coverage
of MEC.
In real world network distance (either hop, latency, or subnet distance) is harder
to quantify and does not reflect geographical distance well, because network address,
such as IP, are usually not uniformly distributed or segmented. Less network hops
don’t always mean closer geographic distance. On the other hand geographic distance
mapped from IP address is easier to quantify and relative reliable. Even though there
are cases that IP address incorrectly mapped to wrong geographical locations (mostly
depending on IP database), in reality this doesn’t impair privacy. Therefore, in our
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simulation we will assume all IP addresses can be correctly mapped so our evaluation
can rely on geographical distance of network attaching point for comparison.
Performance overhead is measured as the extra hops compared to optimal route,
applying our Performance equation. Fig 4.3 shows Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of performance overhead of four competitors. “VPN” apparently has largest
performance penalty as all traffics go through a static point no matter when Mobile
Node moves to. On the other hand “Cellular Data Network” has the lowest perfor-
mance overhead since the data path is almost always near optimal as the Internet
Gateway is always nearby. However, note that this low overhead accompanied with
multiple dysconnectivity of existing connections as each change of Internet Gateway
will disturb ongoing traffic and connection. “MSS” in two configurations show great
performance overhead that are very close to “Cellular Data Network” without sacri-
ficing neither connectivity nor privacy.
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Figure 4.3.: Performance Overhead Comparison
Fig 4.4 presents a point-in-time performance overhead among four. It is clear
that VPN always has high performance overhead cost. MEC based MSS generally
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has lower performance overhead comparing to Public Cloud based MSS. “Cellular
Data Network” performance overhead decreased in last one third time range mostly
due to Mobile Node not moving much during that period.
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Figure 4.4.: Performance Overhead Per Sampling Point Comparison
Location privacy is measured based on our location privacy evaluation equation.
Fig 4.5 displays the average location privacy metrics. VPN unsurprising dominate as
it only exposed the VPN address no matter where the Mobile Node or Peer Node,
and in general Mobile Node would select a VPN server far from its actually location.
MSS in two configurations perform good, and MEC based one beat public cloud based
one. Cellular Data Network generally doesn’t protect Mobile Node’s location privacy
much, unless in rural large cell areas where an Internet Gateway actually covers large
area.
The overall signaling cost, including outgoing (setting up connection to a Peer
Node), lookup (incoming connection from Peer Node), and update (update all Proxies
when Mobile Node changing attaching point) are illustrated in Fig 4.7
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Figure 4.7.: Signaling Cost Comparison
We further experimented with different maximum allowed Proxies, i.e. maximum
1, 4, 16, and 32 Proxies for each Mobile Node in simulation. Fig 4.8 shows that when
allowing more Proxies privacy metric improved. On the other hand the percentage of
improvement starts to become less for our simulation setup when allowed maximum
Proxies is more than 4, and became less significant when allowed Proxies increased
to 16. Our further analysis shows the sweet spot is around 8, and the reason is that
8 Proxies are about large enough to cover the 20 Peer Nodes we selected for each
Mobile Node.
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5 CONCLUSION
This research originated from recognition of cellular base Internet mobility expos-
ing privacy vulnerability and lacking generic Internet mobility support. Since lots of
researches had been done to implement fundamentally mobility friendly or oriented
Internet but none of them succeeded in real world, investigation of what Internet
mobility requires and why these proposals are not real world feasible was conducted,
and concluded with principals on how to create an economic feasible Internet mobility
support solution. Based on the novel proxy paradigm we proposed, Mobility Support
Service (MSS) architecture was introduced to enhance network location privacy pro-
tection and mobility support in Internet. Details of prototype implementation is
discussed, and simulations were conducted for validation.
The major contributions and novelty of this research include: we reviewed the
state-of-the-art Internet mobility support proposals and solutions, and found a few
hurdling problems overlooked by previous researches; we studied the economic viabil-
ity of protocols and system designed for Internet, especially mobility support system;
we examined the role of network location privacy protection in Internet mobility sup-
port, identified most important factors, and proposed metrics to quantify and evaluate
them; we proposed a novelty proxying paradigm that aggressively push proxy close
to remote peer, and have multiple proxies simultaneously for single end host. This
paradigm is the key for minimizing interruption and performance penalty brought
by mobility, and maximizing network location privacy protection; we proposed an
Internet mobility support system that can support a generic Internet mobility and
protect network location privacy, and this framework can accommodate/complement
some important existing protocols and solutions; we designed algorithms for man-
aging proxy allocation against criteria including multiple performance metrics and
overhead.
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This research could be further extended in a few areas. Statistical model is the
most intuitive and usually most precise tool to predict request patterns. For example,
system can track history of a subscriber’s repeated outgoing and incoming connection
peers along with time ranges, so that a generalized individual model can be created to
adapt to this particular subscriber’s usage. The system this information to improve
user’s performance by pre-allocating Proxies at expected zones, while lower operation
cost by consolidating Proxy. Subscribers’ everyday activities provide enough data set
for Machine Learning to discover and improve prediction model, and other statistics
tools such as Bayesian network can also be used to promote prediction successful
rate. On the broader level, the overall usage pattern of Virtual Routers which serve
all subscribers is an even better Machine Learning target, since the overall usage will
be more regular and easy to predict.
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